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THE CASE FOR UNITARY ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL
LABOR LAW-Concerning a Specialized Article III Court
and the Reorganization of Existing Agencies*
by
Charles J. Morris**
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• This Article is an expanded and revised version of material presented by the author
in two shorter papers: Labor Court: A New Perspective, delivered July' 1, 1971, at NEW
YORK UNIVERSITY, TWENTY-FOURTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR, which will be
included in the forthcoming publication of the proceedings of that conference by Matthew
Bender & Co. The Need for New and Coherent Regulatory Mechanisms, delivered Nov. 18,
1971, at WHARTON SCH. FIN. & COM. (UNIV. PENN. IND'L REL. UNIT & LAB. REL.
COUNCIL), is published in COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, SURVIVAL IN THE '70's? (R. Rowan
ed. 1972). Consent of the copyright holders of the foregoing papers has been obtained
for the publication of this Article, and all copyrights, including the right to reproduce this
Article in whole or in part, are reserved.
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S PEAKING at the Williamsburg Conference on the Judiciary,1 the President
of the United States reviewed the condition of American law enforcement
and concluded that there was an urgent need to improve the prevailing system
of justice. Although he was referring primarily to criminal law enforcement,
the same assessment might be made of certain components in our system of
civil procedure. This is especially true of the enforcement of the multiple
federal laws which regulate private sector labor relations. As President Nixon
stated, " 'More of the same' is not the answer. What is needed now is genuine
reform-the kind of change that requires imagination and daring, that demands
a focus on ultimate goals.""
This writer believes that the most urgent need in labor law today is procedural reform to improve the enforcement of the substantive rules already
existing! It is my thesis that an imaginative restructuring of administrative and
judicial machinery into a unitary system is required, and that such a system
would provide a more effective means to achieve the ultimate goals of national
labor policy.
These ultimate goals are firmly established. They are the basic substantive
rules embedded in the language of the statutes and elaborated in key decisions of the Supreme Court. These rules shape the distinctive contours of
American labor law.' The legal doctrines in this system include the following:
(1) A democratic means to establish or reject union representation."
1 Nixon,

Reforming the Administration of Justice, 57 A.B.A.J. 421 (1971).

' Id. at 422.
' See Morris, Procedural Reform in Labor Law--A Preliminary Paper, 35 J. AIR L. &
COM. 536 (1969), in SOUTHWESTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION, LABOR LAW DEVELOPMENTS
-17TH
ANNUAL INSTITUTE 351 (1971).
4
See generally C. MORRIS, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW (1971) [hereinafter cited
as DEVELOPING LABOR LAW].

5National Labor Relations Act 5 9, 29 U.S.C. S 159 (1970); Railway Labor Act 5
2(Ninth), 45 U.S.C. § 152(Ninth) (1970).
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(2)
(3)

A concept of exclusive majority representation by labor unions.!
An obligation by the employer and union representative to bargain
with each other in good faith."
(4) Enforceability of collective bargaining contracts through grievance
procedures, arbitration, and the judicial process
(5) Regulation of the economic weapons which may be used in relation
to collective bargaining.9

(6)

Protection of employees against various forms of discrimination by
either employers or unions."

Changes in substantive law will continue to be needed and adopted. Relatively minor changes in the overall structure of labor law also will likely
occur from time to time. For example, reform legislation regarding the handling of emergency disputes," and the extension of existing laws to cover agricultural employees," may be enacted in the near future. But the basic direction
of the American labor law system will probably not be altered so long as our
economic system remains relatively intact.
American labor law has now arrived at a stage in its legal development
where the nature of the need for change invites, though, of course, does not
guarantee, an attitude of statesmanship among the various interest groups
which participate regularly in the labor law process, i.e., unions, management
organization, minority groups, and public interest spokesmen." Their objective
6

National Labor Relations Act § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970); Railway Labor
Act § 2(Ninth), 45 U.S.C. 5 152(Ninth) (1970).
7
National Labor Relations Act §§ 8(a) (5), (b) (3), 29 U.S.C. §5 158(a) (5),
(b)(3) (1970); Railway Labor Act §§ 2(First), (Seventh), (Ninth), 6, 45 U.S.C.
5 8152(First), (Seventh), (Ninth), 156 (1970).
Labor Management Relations Act §§ 203, 204, 301, 29 U.S.C. §5 173, 174, 185
(1970); Railway Labor Act §§ 2(First), (Second), 3, 45 U.S.C. §§ 152(First), (Second), 153 (1970). See gene-rally International Ass'n of Machinists v. Central Airlines,
372 U.S. 682 (1963); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S.
574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); Textile
Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
'National Labor Relations Act 55 8(b)(4), (b)(7), 13, 29 U.S.C. 5 158(b) (4),
(b) (7), 163 (1970). See gene-rally Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union Local 770,
398 U.S. 235 (1970); American Ship Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965); NLRB v.
Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v.
Chicago
River & Ind. R.R., 353 U.S. 30 (1957).
' 0 Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330
(1953); Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944); United Rubber Workers v.
NLRB, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967); Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1970); Age Discrimination
in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1970); Civil Rights Act, title VII, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e to 2000e-15 (1970), as amended, Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972,
Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); Railway
Labor Act §§ 2(Fourth), (Ninth), 45 U.S.C. § 152(Fourth), (Ninth) (1970).
"E.g.,
Emergency Disputes Bill, S. 594, H.R.J. Res. 364, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
12
E.g., House Labor Committee Bill, H.R. 7152, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
I'NLRB Chairman Miller, testifying recently before the Thompson Committee, commented:
[Tfhe problems go wider and deeper than I think the testimony before you
thus far has directly indicated. . . . [W]e need some new, creative thinking
in order to develop proposals which are both sound and also as acceptable as
possible to the sometimes divergent views of the several segments of the industrial relations community and of the variety of views represented in Congress. . . . [I hope there will develop] a joint labor-management initiative
which would result in a mutually acceptable approach which could then be
articulated in draft legislation for the consideration of the Congress.
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should be a joint effort" to achieve meaningful improvement in the administration and enforcement of existing labor laws in the private sector. I am aware
of the great odds against the formation of any such program of togetherness
among these diverse groups. However, within the procedural package presented
here, there is perhaps enough mutual advantage to surmount innate suspicion
-at least temporarily.
I.

THE URGENT NEED FOR PROCEDURAL REFORM

Labor law enforcement is unduly complex. Administration of the various
laws is spread among too many different agencies and tribunals whose jurisdictions overlap and conflict. The field has become a paradise for labor lawyers
and other specialists in industrial relations. To the employees for whose protection the laws were designed, however, the field has become a veritable maze.
In a bungling way the system works for most of the employees most of the
time. But for many it does not work at all. There is nothing about the practice
of labor law, any more than there was about the precarious art of commonlaw pleading, to merit special admiration. The intricacy of the system serves no
social purpose when it fails to deliver on its promises to substantial numbers
of employees and to other groups whose rights the law is presumed to protect.
The sporting theory of jurisprudence should have disappeared with trial by
combat. 5
It would be a mistake to focus only on the National Labor Relations Act"6
in the search for areas in need of procedural reform. We need to be reminded
occasionally that labor relations are also governed by other federal laws, such
as the federal common law of the collective bargaining agreement under section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act," title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 8
and the 1866 Civil Rights Act,19 the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act," the various wage and hour statutes," the Age Discrimination in
Statement of Edward B. Miller, NLRB Chairman, Hearings on H.R. 7152 Before Special
Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 295 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Miller]. [Editor's Note: Chairman Miller, on May 12 and 26, 1972,
delivered remarks in which he advocated the adoption of a unitary system incorporating
many of the features suggested by Professor Morris. "Toward an Improved Labor Judiciary,"
NLRB Press Release No. R-1230 (May 26, 1972).)
"Joint legislative action has not been the norm in the passage of federal labor laws.
See DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 1-110. However, the railroads and railroad unions on several
notable occasions have jointly sponsored legislation. See Railway Employees Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 240 (1965) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (regarding the passage of the
1926 Railway Labor Act); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River & Ind. R.R.,
353 U.S. 30, 37 (1957) (regarding the passage of the 1934 Railway Labor Act).
"See note 81 infra.
1'29 U.S.C. § 151-68 (1970).
"Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957); National Labor Relations
Act § 301, 29 U.S.C.
185 (1970); cf. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Central Airlines, 372 U.S. 682 (1963); Railway Labor Act § 204, 45 U.S.C. § 184 (1970).
1842 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15 (1970), as amended, Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Star. 103 (codified in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
1"42 U.S.C.
1981 (1970).
2029 U.S.C. § 401-531 (1970).
"E.g., Consumer Credit Protection Act, title III, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1671-77 (1970); Fair
Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1970); Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)
(1970); Portal-to-Portal Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 251-62 (1970); Miller Act, 40 U.S.C.
§§ 270(a)-(d) (1970); Davis-Bacon Act, 40 U.S.C. § 276(a) (1970); Contract Work
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Employment Act of 1967, 2 and, for two major industries, the Railway Labor
Act."' There are other federal statutes which further regulate the employment
relationship.' Employee relations simply cannot be divided into tight little
compartments with convenient labels.
A general reassessment of the procedural devices which have been created
in a piecemeal fashion to administer and enforce the half-dozen or more labor
statutes regulating private sector employee relations seems warranted. In this
age of computers and space travel it is surely possible to develop an integrated
system of administrative and enforcement tribunals that would achieve two
reasonable objectives: (1) a maximum of voluntary compliance; and (2) a
fair and efficient means to enforce involuntary compliance.
The need for reform has grown more acute as the emphasis in labor problems has shifted markedly away from problems concerning union organization.
Today, the fastest growing area of concern, at least in the private sector, is
precisely where collective bargaining already exists. As collective bargaining
has come of age, new problems and new laws have emerged. But old methods,
characterized especially by inadequate NLRB action, still prevail. The new
problem areas involve contract interpretation, arbitration, racial and sexual
discrimination, and relations between the employee and the union which is
legally authorized to represent him. Existing procedures for treating both the
old and new problems are demonstrably inefficient or inappropriate.
A. The National Labor Relations BoardIts Perennial Problems
There is a growing awareness among interested observers that the NLRB
has failed in its mission of providing adequate means to achieve the policy
objectives which Congress intended. Severe criticism of the Board is of course
an old story. For thirty-six years certain familiar voices have regularly de-

nounced the Board, its members, and the underlying legislation which encourages the practice of collective bargaining."5 It is easy to dismiss such criticism as voices of reaction nostalgically crying for a return to a laissez-faire
system of employer-employee relations. But it is not so easy to dismiss some
of the newer voices of dissent. These voices often urge reform of the Board

rather than its destruction or replacement. However, many of the current
charges cut so deeply into the Board's vital parts that reform and repair are
pitifully inadequate to correct what in reality are inherent procedural defects.

Consider the recent testimony before the Thompson Committee by Bernard
Kleinman, General Counsel of the United Steelworkers. He scored the Board's
"proven ineffectiveness against determined violators,"" a conclusion which he
Hours Standards Act, 40 U.S.C. § 327-32 (1970); Walsh-Healey Public
41 U.S.C. §§ 35-45 (1970); McNamara-O'Hara Service Contract Act,
351-57 (1970); Hours of Service Act, 45 U.S.C. S 61-65 (1970).
2229 U.S.C. b 621-34 (1970).
2345 U.S.C. S§ 151-63, 181-88 (1970).
'See, e.g., Labor Management Relations Act
301, 303, 29 U.S.C.
(1970); Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 301-09
tary Selective Service Act of 1967, 50 U.S.C. §5 451-73 (1970) (§ 459,
rights).
25 DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 30-34.
6
Hearings on H.R. 7152, supra note 13, at 156.

Contracts Act,
41 U.S.C. §

5§ 185, 187
(1970); Milireemployment
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found reflected in the refusals to bargain in forty-four percent of employer
violations of the Taft-Hartley Act." Jerome Cooper, a prominent attorney who
represents unions in the South, told the same congressional committee that he
had some tendency to believe that the Board should be abolished because it
has come perilously close to being a fraud on unorganized workers in his area."'
In an earlier Article on procedural reform in labor law, I arrived at a similar conclusion, stating that "[alfter 34 years, the National Labor Relations Act
still requires vigorous enforcement, [and that] [v]oluntary acceptance and
compliance have not been achieved to the extent necessary for successful execution of the national labor policy."'" I concurred in the Thompson Committee
findings that "there is a 'regrettable unwillingness on the part of some to accept the basic tenets'2' of the Act," and that "[a] growing body of evidence
indicates that the freedom of choice guaranteed by Congress-to join a union
or to refrain from so doing-has not worked well in practice.""
Administrative Delay. Many of the Board's friendlier critics consider delay to
be the major obstacle to effective enforcement of the Act. Florian Bartosic predicates his proposal for reform on the need to eliminate delay."2 The Cox
Panel' in 1960 and the Pucinski Subcommittee 4 in 1961 likewise focused
on the delay factor. Delay is indeed a serious problem, but it is only a symptom
" See also Statement of Elliott Bredhoff, General Counsel for Industrial Union Dep't,
AFL-CIO, Hearings on H.R. 7152, supra note 13, at 187:
[E]ven after more than thirty-five years of purported legislative protection,
there is still not presently any meaningful, effective or timely remedy to
counter a hard core employer who engages in an unlawful refusal to bargain
or discriminatorily discharges an employee to discourage membership in a
union. . . . [T] he Board . . . has yet to fashion remedies which effectively
protect employees in the exercise of their most fundamental rights under
the Act.
2Hearings on H.R. 7152, supra note 13, at 253. See also Harris, The Choice Before
Us: Labor Board, Court, or District Court, in SOUTHWESTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION, LABOR
LAW DEVELOPMENTS-17TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE 331, 332-34 (1971).
The AFL-CIO has joined the ranks of critics of the National Labor Relations Board. At
its Biennial Convention in Bal Harbour, Florida, it passed a resolution indicting the administration of the National Labor Relations Act. The resolution stated that the NLRB's
efforts toward achieving the statutory objective of protecting the rights of workers to join
unions and bargain effectively "raise doubts as to the continued viability of the Act and
the labor board which administrates it." It noted that one of the reasons for the increase
in discriminatory discharges "is that the act as administered by the board and the courts, has
in many cases become virtually useless." The resolution concluded that "the labor act is
substantially failing in its purposes as far as workers and unions are concerned" and recommended that "the National Labor Relations Act should be essentially rewritten, and its
administration by the board substantially changed, to make it effectively enforceable against
employers and fair as between employers and unions." The resolution contained specific
proposals which the labor federation contended would further these objectives. BNA, Daily
Labor Report, at DI-3 (Nov. 22, 1971).
29Morris, supra note 3, at 555-56.
5
" SPECIAL SUBCOMM. ON LABOR (HOUSE COMM. ON EDUCATION & LABOR), 90TH
CONG., 2D SEss., REPORT ON NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT REMEDIES: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE 1 (Comm. Print 1968).

11Id.at 5.
"2Bartosic, Labor Law Reform-The NLRB and a Labor Court, 4 GA. L. REV. 647
(1970).
25

ADVISORY PANEL ON LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS LAW (SENATE COMM. ON
LABOR & PUBLIC WELFARE), REPORT ON ORGANIZATION AND PROCEDURE OF THE NA-

TIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, S.

Doc. No. 81, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1960).

'4SUBCOMM. OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON EDUCATION & LABOR, 87TH CONG., 2D SESS.,

REPORT ON THE NLRB 2 (Comm. Print 1961).
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of a more fundamental weakness: The Board's inherent inability to achieve
either widespread voluntary compliance or sufficient involuntary compliance
through the use of effectual procedural devices.
Frequent Policy Shifts. Among the Board's chief deficiencies, and one that has
been the subject of widespread criticism, is that the political appointment of
Board members for five-year terms creates a tendency for certain Board policies to make pendulum-type swings which reflect shifts in national political
administrations. A typical comment regarding this phenomenon was the statement of Leonard Janofsky, speaking on behalf of the United States Chamber
of Commerce: "What alarms the business community is that the NLRB restructures the Federal labor law to coincide with the political and socioeconomic predilections respecting industrial relations of those individual members
who happen to constitute a majority of the Board at any particular time."'
During the various time periods in which such majority shifts have occurred,
the Board has been characterized, quite naturally, as the Truman Board, the
Eisenhower Board, the Kennedy-Johnson Board, and now the Nixon Board."6
These labels are of course too simplistic, 7 but there is truth in the general
accusation regarding political swings of the pendulum, for the policy shifts
can be easily documented. 8 Regardless of the accuracy of the charges, however,
and also regardless of the advantage that may be claimed for such policy shifts,
such as the importance of national labor policy being responsive to political,
economic, and social changes,"9 the conclusion remains that the Board's public
image has suffered from such shifts. Accordingly, widespread voluntary acceptance of NLRB rulings has been difficult to achieve. The Board has had a
credibility problem in the matter of stare decisis.
Lack of Effective Process and Equitable Remedies. Another important problem

area traceable to the Board's organizational structure is the unavailability of
" Hearings on Congressional Oversight of Administrative Agencies (NLRB) Before the
Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d
Sess., pt. 1, at 356 (1968).
" For criticism of the early months of the "Nixon Board," see Statement of Stephen I.
Schlossberg, General Counsel for Int'l Union of Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural
Implement Workers of America (UAW), Hearings on H.R. 7152, supra note 13, at 18, 20.
-, See Winter, Judicial Review of Agency Decisions: The Labor Board and the Courts,
1968 SuP. CT. REV. 53, 64-67. Compare Bartosic, supra note 32, at 660.
" Examples of "Eisenhower Board" decisions which changed "Truman Board" decisions
include the following: McAllister Transfer, 110 N.L.R.B. 1769 (1954); B.V.D., 110
N.L.R.B. 1412 (1954); Terry Poultry Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 1097 (1954); Washington CocaCola Bottling Works, 107 N.L.R.B. 299 (1953). Examples of pivotal "Kennedy Board"
decisions include the following: Bernal Foam Prods. Co., 146 N.L.R.B. 1277 (1964), overruling Aiello Dairy Farms, 110 N.L.R.B. 1365 (1954) (which had overruled an earlier
Board decision in M.H. Davidson Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 142 (1951)); Town & Country Mfg.
Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 1022 (1962), overruling Brown-Dunkin Co., 125 N.L.R.B. 1379
(1959); Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., 130 N.L.R.B. 1558, modified, 138 N.L.R.B.
550, enforced, 322 F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir. 1963), aff'd, 379 U.S. 203 (1964); Smitley,
d/b/a Crown Cafeteria, 130 N.L.R.B. 1183, afl'd, 327 F.2d 351 (9th Cit. 1964). The decision of the current Board in General Motors Corp., 191 N.L.R.B. No. 149, 77 L.R.R.M.
1537 (1971), may be indicative of a shifting of interest narrowing its predecessor Board's
decision in Ozark Trailers, Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. 561 (1966). See DEVELOPING LABOR LAW
418-22. See also Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. No. 150, 77 L.R.R.M. 1931 (1971).
See generally note 35 supra.
" See Bartosic, supra note 32, at 647.
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quick and certain equitable relief. Injunctive relief is, of course, fully available
and mandatory under section 10 (1)' for most of the serious union unfair labor
practices. But this is not always a desirable remedy, for a 10(1) injunction is
usually issued without regard to the ultimate outcome of the case, and it is
issued by a court which will have no responsibility for the final decision.41 The
unfulfilled promise of the section 10(j) injunction," which requires General
Counsel initiation plus specific authorization by the Board" and then the convincing of a local federal judge that a temporary injunction should be granted,
demonstrates that 10(j) is structurally incapable of being the swift and sure
temporary remedy that is needed if the Act's guarantees are to be meaningful."
For the great bulk of unfair labor practice cases, the only remedy in contested
actions is the one which waits at the end of the long road that winds tortuously
from charge, to investigation, to issuance of complaint, to hearing before a
trial examiner, to reproduction of the stenographic record, to filing of briefs, to
the issuance of the trial examiner's intermediate report, to filing of exceptions
with more briefs, to the internal Board procedures whereby the record is again
read, analyzed, digested, and summarized as a memorandum, until finally a
Board decision emerges." Then may come appellate review. The majority of
NLRB4 orders in contested cases are either appealed or require appellate enforcement. 6
The absence of traditional judicial remedies encourages violations of the
Act. After thirty-seven years, the largest segment of the Board's unfair labor
practice business is still the discriminatory discharge. 4' This should not be too
surprising, for the Board's cumbersome process is itself an organizational
gambit in the game of union versus management. When a respondent employer chooses not to settle a case, the Board has no option but to proceed through
all the laborious steps of prolonged litigation. And this time-consuming process
will exhaust the patience of any employee but the heartiest and most persistent." According to the Thompson Committee report, "administrative judicial
40
41

National Labor Relations Act S 10(1), 29 U.S.C. § 160(1) (1970).
See DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 847-51; cf. Terminal Freight Handling Co. v. Solien,

444 F.2d 699 (8th Cir. 1971).
42National Labor Relations Act S 10(j), 29 U.S.C. § 160(j) (1970); see McCulloch,
New Problems in the Administration of the Labor-Management Relations Act.- The Taft
Hartley Injunction, 16 Sw. L.J. 82 (1962).
43
National Labor Relations Act § 10, 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1970). See generally DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 845-46, 849-51.
"Compare the federal court remedial devices issued in the exercise of equity jurisdiction
respecting voting rights (vr) and title VII racial discrimination (rd) cases. E.g., United
States v. Louisiana, 380 U.S. 145 (1965) (vr); Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co., 421
F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1970) (rd); Local 189, United Papermakers v. United States, 416
F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970)
(rd); United States v.
Hayes Int'l Corp., 415 F.2d 1038 (5th Cit. 1969) (rd); Asbestos Workers Local 53 v.
Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969) (rd).
45See DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 820-40.
4635 NLRB ANN. REP. 19, 76-84, 93-125, 194 (app. A, table 19) (1970). Obtaining
appellate enforcement of the decision may prove to be more time consuming than appeal
of the decision. See generally DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 874-80.
4735 NLRB ANN. REP. 157 (app. A, table 2) (1970).
48 See Statement of Arnold Ordman, NLRB General Counsel (including charts compiled
by NLRB Data Processing Section (May 24, 1971)], Hearings on H.R. 7152, supra note
13, at 383-84. The charts show 1970 fiscal year lapse time (median days) for handling
of an 8(a) (3) allegation to be: From filing to complaint-55 days; from complaint to the
close of a hearing-61 days; from the close of a hearing to a trial examiner's decision-81
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delay in processing [8 (a) (3)I" cases vitiates any effective redress--economic
pressures force these discharged employees to forego their right to reinstatement in exchange for a partial 'back pay' award .... ""
This conclusion is supported by the statistics in the Board's annual reports.
During the 1970 fiscal year,51 6,828 employees were awarded back pay. But
for the same period only 3,779 employees were offered job reinstatement,
and of these only 2,723 accepted reinstatement. If we assume that these figures
refer to the same group of 8(a) (3) dischargees (an assumption which is
surely valid for the bulk of the cases), only thirty-nine percent of the dischargees whose cases were meritorious actually obtained reinstatement. The
average amount of back pay collected by the discharged employee was only
$403 (a sum undoubtedly smaller than the average attorney's fee paid). Even
the largest back pay awards, obtained after time-consuming appellate court
enforcement of the Board's order, were relatively small. Because discharged
employees are under a duty to mitigate damages, 2 these awards averaged less
than $888 per employee. If temporary injunctions were readily available-and
this would be true for 8(b) (2)"5 conduct by unions as well as for 8(a) (3)
conduct by employers-it is likely that fewer discharge cases would require full
litigation on the merits. Most would probably settle; but of greater consequence,
the number and frequency of discriminatory discharges would probably decrease. There would be little if any tactical advantage to be gained from a discharge, and, because of the effect on other employees, an early reinstatement
is something that the employer would ordinarily wish to avoid.
More meaningful remedies are required for all types of unfair labor practices.
When an order to bargain is finally issued in an 8(a) (5)4 case, often after
several years of frustrating litigation, the notice posted on the wall may seem
hardly worth the effort. 5 If the Board could tailor-make an equitable remedy
and issue appropriate process early enough to preserve the vital positions of the
parties, and if the Board had its own contempt authority to enforce its orders
days; from the trial examiner's decision to a Board decision-i1l6 days; from the Board
decision to a referral to enforcement-44 days; from the enforcement referral to a petition
filed in a circuit court of appeals-243 days; from the filing of enforcement petition to
a circuit court of appeals opinion-255 days. The total median days elapsed from the filing
of a charge to the issuance of a circuit court enforcement order was 855 days, or two years
and four months.
4
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (1970).
5°SPECIAL SUBCOMM. ON LABOR (HOUSE COMM. ON EDUCATION & LABOR), 90TH
CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT ON NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT REMEDIES: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE (Comm. Print 1968).
1

" See 35 NLRB ANN. REP. 160-61 (app. A, table 4) (1970).
e.g., F.W. Woolworth, 90 N.L.R.B. 289 (1950).
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (2) (1970).
54
1d. at § 158(a) (5).
" E.g., Statement of Irving Abramson, General Counsel for International Union of
Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO-CLC, Hearings on H.R. 7152, supra
note 13, at 225:
Nothing so convincingly demonstrates the ineffectiveness of the collective
bargaining obligation as reading opinions of the courts of appeals in the
contempt cases, noting the date the union was certified, the date the court
decided the contempt case, the reference to the loss of union majority, and
the failure of the adjudication to do more than once again order the employer
to bargain . . . . Legal scholars have repeatedly pointed to the ineffectiveness
against a recalcitrant employer of the refusal to bargain obligation because
5"3 See,

of the absence of an effective remedy ....
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both interim and final, there would be no need for an H. K. Porter-" or an
Ex-Cell-O-type" remedy, and no need for the Board to intrude between the
parties in fashioning collective bargaining clauses and benefits. It is in the
exercise of its judicial function (in its "C" case jurisdiction and not in its
role in representation cases) that the Board is basically weak. It is here that
radical restructuring needs to occur.
It should be obvious to us, as it is obvious to many foreign observers," that
the NLRB in the exercise of its unfair labor practice jurisdiction is in reality
a court. But it is a court whose options for remedial action are severely limited.
And this limitation is an Achilles' heel. The debate about a labor court is thus
not whether there should be such a court, but what kind of a court it should
be.
If there is any doubt that the Board is a court when exercising unfair labor
practice jurisdiction, we need only to be reminded of the Board's long-standing
inability to accommodate to the rule-making requirements of the Administrative Procedure Actf Only after a majority of the Supreme Court in Wyman5
GordonW
asserted that promulgation of the Excelsior1 name-and-address rule
constituted rule-making did the Board begin to use APA rule-making procedures, and then only on a very limited basis."2 It is not just happenstance
that NLRB rule-making makes more sense in representation cases than in un" H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970). The Supreme Court held that the
Board had no remedial authority to require a party to agree to a specific bargaining proposal
or to incorporate a provision in a collective agreement (check-off provision) even though
the refusal to incorporate the provision was found to be caused by the employer's desire to
frustrate the collective bargaining process.
"Ex-Cell-O Corp., 185 N.L.R.B. No. 20, 74 L.R.R.M. 1740 (1970), afl'd, 449 F.2d
1058 (1971). The Board, after holding the case for 3 years following oral argument, refused to require the employer to compensate employees for wages and fringe benefits which
arguably they would have obtained at an earlier date in the collective bargaining contract
if the employer had not refused to bargain in violation of the Act. The Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the order of the Board while noting that "[t]he
time delay is unusual and vexing-reflecting principally three years in which the Board
considered the Union's request for additional relief. In hindsight, the Board should have
promptly ordered the bargaining as at least partial relief." 449 F.2d at 1063. See also
International Union of Electrical Workers v. NLRB, 426 F.2d 1243 (1970).
""To a European, or at least a British, observer the United States harbors a strong
'labor court' in the National Labor Relations Board, as reconstituted by the Taft-Hartley
Act in 1947. Itsprosecuting arm (the office of general counsel) was thereafter distinct
from its judgment board. Like the Swedish court, it is a central national tribunal. It enforces the 'peace obligation' under the provisions of the same Act. Essentially, it is surely
a kind of labor court." Wedderburn, Conflicts of "Rights" and Conflicts of "Interests" in

Labor Disputes, in

DISPUTE

SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES IN

FIVE WESTERN

EUROPEAN

COUNTRIES 65, 74-75 (B. Aaron ed. 1969). "[T)he American NLRB . . . for practical
purposes might be considered an American counterpart of the European labor courts."
Schmidt, Conciliation, Adjudication, and Administration: Three Methods of Decision-Making
in Labor Disputes, in DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES IN FIVE WESTERN EUROPEAN
COUNTRIES 45, 49 (B. Aaron ed. 1969).
555 U.S.C. § 553 (1970); see Peck, The Atrophied Rule-Making Powers of the National Labor Relations Board, 70 YALE L.J. 729 (1961). See also Williams, The NLRB
and Administrative Rule-Making, in SOUTHWESTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION, LABOR LAW
DEVELOPMENTS-16TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE 209, 223-26 (1970) for an excellent discussion of the distinctions between the National Labor Relations Board function and administrative rulemaking.
"NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969).
"1Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966).
" In the two years following Wyman-Gordon, the Board's single foray into rulemaking
concerned the establishment of jurisdictional standards applicable to private colleges and
universities. See 29 C.F.R. § 103.1 (1972).
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fair labor practice cases. The difference between the two kinds of cases is the
difference between judicial action and administrative or quasi-legislative action.
Institutional Problems. Among other shortcomings in the Board's process is
the institutional unwieldiness of the organization."5 Chairman Miller has predicted that it would not be long before the Board would be asked to review so
great a volume of cases that he could not perceive how it would physically be
possible for each member to give the careful and judicious attention that the
parties have a right to expect."
Vast duplication of effort within the Board's structure seems inherent in
the system. A case begins with the gathering of affidavits by the charging party;
then there is an investigation by an NLRB field examiner, evaluation by the
NLRB regional office, and possible review by the General Counsel's office in
Washington."' Following the issuance of a complaint, the case is heard by a
trial examiner, who eventually writes a detailed opinion after studying the
transcribed record of the hearing, the exhibits, and the briefs of the parties."
This is almost always followed by the filing of exceptions by one or more of
the parties, and more briefs are submitted to the Board in Washington. At
this point the typical case will be almost a year old."7 Then begins the long
internal process"8 whereby the case winds its way slowly through the legal staffs
of individual Board members, with a decision by the Board finally emerging
many months-and sometimes years-later."
Most of the Board's institutional problems are self-fed. To a considerable
63See Murphy, The National Labor Relations Board-An Appraisal, in SOUTHWESTERN
LEGAL FOUNDATION, LABOR LAW DBVELOPMENTS-14TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE 113, 139
(1968).
"Address by NLRB Chairman Miller, Jan. 22, 1971, Labor Law Conference, La. St.
Univ., in LABOR RELATIONS YEARBOOK 117, 122 (1971). See also "National Labor Relations Board Cases Climb To New High," NLRB Press Release No. 1203 (Sept. 6, 1971).
In fiscal year 1971, there were significant increases in the labor caseload for both the NLRB
and the courts: the Board received 23,770 unfair labor practice charges, 13% over the year
before; the Board issued 806 unfair labor practice decisions, a 21% increase over last fiscal
year; and the U.S. circuit courts of appeals handed down an estimated 372 decisions-involving enforcement and/or review of Board orders-nearly 16% more than the prior year.
" 6NLRB Rules and Regs., 29 C.F.R. § 102.19 (1971).
661d. § 102.45.
67See Ordman, supra note 48, at 311: "For example, the 1971 [fiscal year) median time
stages for the disposition of those unfair labor practice cases which reach the stage of formal
litigation are: From filing of charge to complaint-61 days; from complaint to close of
hearing before a trial examiner-59 days; from close of hearing to trial examiner's decision
-82
days; from trial examiner's decision to Board decision-150 days. The total days
elapsed from the filing of a charge to Board decision is 348 [sic] days."
8 Each Board member has a chief counsel, an assistant chief counsel, and a staff
of about 25 attorneys who act as legal assistants. Unfair labor practice cases
are assigned to an individual legal assistant, who normally is the only person
on the staff to study the entire record. If the case is a simple one, clearly
covered by Board precedent, the legal assistant prepares a draft decision for
approval by a three-man panel of the Board. If the case raises arguable
questions, it may be referred for further consideration to a subpanel of supervisory attorneys from staffs of three different Board members and then to
a panel of three Board members. Only the important cases are discussed by
the full Board.
DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 821.
"E.g., Ex-Cell-O Corp., 185 N.L.R.B. No. 20, 74 L.R.R.M. 1740 (1970), aff'd, 449
F.2d 1058 (D.C. Cir. 1971), where two years elapsed from issuance of the complaint until
submission of the case to the Board, and an additional three years elapsed before the Board
issued its decision. See also notes 48, 67 supra.
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extent, the Board's case-load increases because it takes so long to process a
case, and it takes so long to process a case because there are so many cases.
That cycle will not be broken until the number of cases can be reduced. The
Board's inability to strike quickly, firmly, and with certainty against violators
contributes to the staggering case-load. Certainty of enforcement would encourage more voluntary compliance, which would in turn reduce the case-load
and also shorten the time required for the handling of contested cases."0
Another factor which contributes to delay is the absence of pretrial discovery.
Its availability would shorten the time required for hearings and probably lead
to fairer trials and settlements. This has been the experience under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure,71 and there is nothing peculiar to the law under the
National Labor Relations Act which would suggest a contrary result.
Appellate Review. Another shortcoming in the present structure, as several
commentators have noted, is the high incidence of appellate review."2 Selfenforcing orders would tend to discourage frivolous appeals and would also
expedite compliance with the Board's orders.
Unreviewable Power of the General Counsel. Another serious procedural problem, which many critics have tended to overlook or defend," is the unreviewable power of the General Counsel to determine whether and when a complaint
should issue. Experienced labor law practitioners can usually cite numerous
examples of cases which seemed especially meritorious to the charging party
but which came to an early demise because the regional office refused to issue
a complaint. Sufficient evidence may have been lacking in many such cases,
but without the availability of pretrial discovery, all material evidence could
never come to light. Other meritorious cases may have gone untried simply
7 This should encourage earlier compliance, especially if the decision-making tribunal
has its own power of contempt; and it should also be conducive to more settlements. With
fewer cases to handle, contested cases would be disposed of more expeditiously.
71"Discovery frequently provides evidence that would not otherwise be available to the
parties and thereby makes for a fairer trial or settlement." Advisory Committee's Explanatory Statement Concerning Amendments to the Discovery Rules, 48 F.R.D. 487, 489 (1970),
citing M. ROSENBERG, FIELD SURVEY OF FEDERAL PRETRIAL DISCOVERY (1969); cf.
Jones, Blind Man's Bugl and the Now-Problems of Apocrypha, Inc. and Local 711-Discovery Procedures in Collective Bargaining Disputes, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 571 (1968).
72E.g., Bartosic, supra note 32, at 653. See also ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF U.S.
COURTS, ANN. REP., table B-3 (1970). The high incidence of NLRB appeals is demonstrated by a comparison of NLRB appeals with those from all other federal agencies. Almost half (46.7%) of all cases of court of appeals review of administrative orders in 1969
were NLRB cases. The NLRB had three times as many appeals as the Tax Court, three
times as many as the Immigration and Naturalization Service, more than four times as many
as the Federal Power Commission, and more than four times as many as all the rest of the
agencies combined.
" E.g., Professor Bartosic, supra note 32, at 655, states that the alleged abuses have
never been demonstrated. He may be correct if by "demonstrated" he has reference to a
controlled study of the thousands of cases that have been dismissed or otherwise disposed
of informally. It is hoped that such an empirical study will some day be conducted, though
the task will be formidable. In the meantime, one must rely on personal observation and
experience, which for this author (who actively practiced before the NLRB for 18 years)
leads to the conclusion that a substantial number of meritorious cases have been dismissed
by the General Counsel's office. Many such dismissals have been for lack of evidence, although the material facts establishing the unfair labor practice were usually suspected but
not pursued. Since the charging party is generally required to produce evidence making out
a prima facie case, and since discovery is not available, numerous meritorious cases which
vigorous prosecution could save are never allowed to surface.
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because NLRB investigators and first-line agency attorneys conceivably exercised poor judgment in recommending dismissal of the charges. No one really
knows how many valid charges have been thus denied a hearing.'4
Board personnel appear proud of the high number of cases which are disposed of informally. For example, Chairman Miller in his first major address
after taking office, pointed to the fact that eighty-five percent of the charges
filed with the Board were disposed of "without the need for a trial" and were
closed out within forty median days, a record which he characterized as "fairly
impressive.""5 But most of those were dismissed or withdrawn and not settled.
Chairman Miller would probably have been less impressed if it could be established with certainty that in some of those cases there was a need for a trial.
The Board's Annual Report for fiscal 1969" reveals an interesting analysis
of what actually happened to the bulk of the unfair labor practice charges
filed with the NLRB. During that year a total of almost 19,000 "C" cases
were closed. Of these, thirty-one percent were withdrawn (ordinarily a withdrawal is only a polite form of dismissal) and thirty-six percent were dismissed
without the issuance of complaint. These figures add up to a staggering twothirds of all the cases filed. It is hard to believe that among those almost
13,000 unreviewable determinations there were not substantial numbers of
meritorious cases that could have been proved had such elementary discovery
devices as written interrogatories or oral depositions been available. Perhaps
many others, particularly cases that hinged on credibility determinations, could
have been proved had live evidence been heard and evaluated by someone in
addition to the field examiner.
The defect in the system is in the office itself 77-in the absence of opportunity for review of the General Counsel's refusal to issue a complaint, and
in the absence of a right of the charging party to process his own charge in
lieu of action by the General Counsel. The problem of unreviewable discretion
also raises a serious due process question." The solution, however, lies not in
" Kenneth Culp Davis has noted the structures for internal review within the General
Counsel's office and is high in his praise of those procedures. K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY
JUsTIcE-A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 205 (1969); [1970 Supp.] K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 4.08, at 194-95 (1971). Without citing any evidence, empirical or

otherwise, on which to base his conclusion, Professor Davis says the system succeeds. He
apparently measures that success by the smoothness of the operation, and he is unperturbed
by the fact that there is no provision for review by an external tribunal, or by the fact that
the internal procedure is not often used and rarely results in a reversal of the original action. No figures are presehtly available indicating the percentage of regional office dismissals which are appealed. However, of those which are appealed, on the average only
about 6% have been reversed by the General Counsel's Office of Appeals. See 1 CCH LAB.
L. REP. 5 1150.05 (1968). Professor Davis apparently exempts the NLRB General Counsel
from his general charge that: "Our system of justice has too long ignored the enormous
discretionary power of prosecutors. Such power need not be unfettered. It can and should
be confined, structured, and checked. The judicial habit of regarding prosecutors' discretion
as unreviewable for arbitrariness or abuse is very much in need of reexamination." [1970
Supp.] K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 28.16, at 990 (1971).
" Address by NLRB Chairman Miller, Oct. 8, 1970, in LABOR RELATIONS YEARBOOK
206, 208 (1970).
7634 NLRB ANN. REP. 208-09 (app. A, table 7) (1969).
" This criticism is, of course, leveled at the statutory authority of the General Counsel,
not at any individual who has held that office. The tradition of honesty coupled with outstanding ability was exemplified by Arnold Ordman, who recently retired from the position
after eight years of distinguished service.
78 On the nonreviewability of the General Counsel's discretion (court without jurisdiction either to order issuance or to set aside refusal to issue complaint), see, e.g., Hamlet
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destroying the office but rather in providing a viable legal alternative to the
General Counsel's refusal to authorize a complaint. The office of General
Counsel, or one similar to it, is essential to the scheme of the statute if legal
promises are to become realities for the groups intended to be protected.
Jurisdictional Conflicts. Lastly, there is the matter of conflicting jurisdiction
with other tribunals and other laws. Because unfair labor practice cases increasingly involve questions relating to enforcement and interpretation of
collective bargaining contracts, circumstances requiring the accommodation of
1 0
arbitration awards and court decisions under both section 301T' and title VII
v. NLRB, 80 L.R.R.M. 2080 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 92 S. Ct. 1770 (1972); Dunn v.
Retail Clerks' Local 1529, 307 F.2d 285 (6th Cir. 1962); Retail Stores Employees Local
954 v. Rothman, 298 F.2d 330 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Bandlow v. Rothman, 278 F.2d 866
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 909 (1960); General Drivers Local 886 v. NLRB, 179
F.2d 492 (10th Cit. 1950); Southern Cal. Dist. Council of Laborers v. Ordman, 318 F.
Supp. 633 (C.D. Cal. 1970); cf. Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees v. Lockridge,
403 U.S. 274, 303 (Douglas, J., dissenting) :
If the General Counsel holds against the complaining party and refuses to
issue an unfair labor practice complaint, the decision is apparently unreviewFrom the viewpoint of an aggrieved employee, there is not a trace
able ....
of equity in this long-drawn, expensive remedy. If he musters the resources
to exhaust the administrative remedy, the chances are that he too will be
exhausted. If the General Counsel issues a complaint, then he stands in line
for some time waiting for the Board's decision. If the General Counsel refuses to act, then the employee is absolutely without remedy.
Prior to issuance of a complaint, the charging party has no right of participation in the
settlement of his charge. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Solien, 450 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1971),
cart. denied, 92 S. Ct. 1242 (1972). Once a complaint issues, however, the charging party
is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his objections to an informal settlement between
the regional director and the respondent. See Leeds & Northrup Co. v. NLRB, 357 F.2d
527 (3d Cit. 1966). See generally DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 834-35. But cf. Beverly
v. Lone Star Lead Constr. Corp., 437 F.2d 1136 (5th Cit. 1971); Fekete v. United States
Steel Corp., 424 F.2d 331 (3d Cir. 1970). The claimant, after first filing charges with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission under title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,
may maintain a separate civil suit to judicially: (1) determine question of alleged employment discrimination even if the EEOC found no reasonable cause to charge employer
violation; or (2) compel involuntary compliance with the law even if EEOC failed to obtain voluntary compliance by the employer. There is no presumption against judicial review
and in favor of administrative absolution unless that purpose is fairly discernible in the
statutory scheme. Congress simply did not intend for EEOC to preempt the ultimate rights
of the claimant. See also Goldberg v. Kelley, 397 U.S. 254, 261-71 (1970), in which the
Supreme Court held that a duly qualified welfare recipient is entitled to evidentiary hearing
before terminating title IV Social Security Act benefits which are considered a matter of
statutory entitlement. Procedural due process requires: (1) timely and adequate notice detailing the reasons for termination; (2) an effective opportunity to defend-confront adverse witnesses and present own arguments and oral evidence; and (3) the recipient be
given a right to counsel. Moreover, the decision maker must: (1) be impartial, not having
participated before in the determination under review; and (2) state the reasons for his
determination and indicate the evidence relied on. The Court went on to state its policy
grounds: "[T)he interest of the eligible recipient in the uninterrupted receipt of public
assistance (which provides him with essential food, clothing, housing, and medical care),
coupled with the State's interest that his payment not be erroneously terminated, clearly
outweighs the State's competing concern to prevent any increase in its fiscal and administrative 7 9burdens." 397 U.S. at 266.
Labor Management Relations Act S 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970).
8OCivil Rights Act tit. VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15 (1970), as amended,
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (codified
in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). A provision in the House version of the 1972 amendments, rejected by the Conference Committee and not included in the bill as finally enacted, would have vested the EEOC with sole federal authority to combat discrimination in
employment. This writer does not consider such an ouster of NLRB, arbitration, and Office
of Federal Contract compliance jurisdiction to be a workable solution to the problem of
overlapping jurisdiction, but the House passage of the provision does point up the seriousness of the problem.
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have become commonplace. Considerable amounts of time, money, and legal
talent are expended on jurisdictional issues in these cases," but still the selection
of an appropriate forum is at best a Hobson's choice. At worst, it may be the
wrong choice. An aggrieved party might obtain only an incomplete remedy 8 or even no remedy at all-because he has chosen the wrong forum. Many
types of cases involve the issue of conflicting jurisdiction. An examination of
four currently active types will serve to illustrate some of the more critical
areas where the proliferation of enforcement tribunals presents jurisdictional
dilemmas: (1) cases concerning the duty of fair representation; (2) cases
concerning successorship in collective bargaining; (3) cases concerning discrimination against minority employees; and (4) conflicts between NLRB
action and the arbitration process.
(a)

The Duty of Fair Representation. The dilemma which typically faces

the Board in a common type of fair representation case was illustrated in
Automotive Plating." The Board found a union in violation of the duty of fair
representation because it had refused to process the grievance of a discharged
employee. On the strength of the Supreme Court's decision in C & C Plywood,
the Board asserted that it had jurisdiction to construe the collective bargaining
contract to determine if in fact the discharge was in violation of the agreement.
The problem, however, was the Board's lack of jurisdiction over the employer,
for there had been no allegation of collusion with the union and neither section
8(b) (2) nor section 8(a) (3) was involved. The Board's remedy was to
order the union to process the grievance and, if necessary, to carry it to arbitration. As might have been expected, the employer declined to arbitrate; whereupon the Board ordered the union to pay the aggrieved employee back pay
from the date of the initial refusal to handle the grievance until such time as
the union "fulfill[ed] its duty of fair representation"" or the employee obtained equivalent employment, whichever was sooner. This remedy would
seem to be in conflict with the more limited measure of union damages which
"' See Bok, Reflections on the Distinctive Character of American Labor Laws, 84 HARv.
L. REv. 1394, 1462-63 (1971). The author takes issue with "the highly decentralized, adversary environment" of labor law practice, "the traditional preference for elaborate procedures, multiple opportunities for review, and highly particularized decisionmaking" and
a mentality "motivated by individual, short term interests [which] encourages the search
to find loopholes and exceptions or create tactical delays." All of this is productive of litigation, and adds to the legal burdens. He calls into question "the efficiency of the system"
and asks "whether all of its forms and elaborations are worth the cost they entail." That
is: "Are the various rules having their intended effect on the behavior of the parties? What
are the costs of delay and in what types of cases are they most severe? What are the total
costs of administering particular rules and are all these costs justified? And why do we continue to have a large and mounting number of elementary [discriminatory discharge)
cases?" The author calls "for new methods of research . . . not favored by legal scholars
[to confront) such issues and develop new ways of analyzing them. . . . Students of regulation must point to inefficiencies in the process and suggest simpler or more effective substitutes."
8
E.g., Automotive Plating Corp., 170 N.L.R.B. 1234 (1968), enforced, 454 F.2d 17
(2d 83Cir. 1972).
E.g., Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 (1971);
Plumbers Local 100 v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690 (1963).
"Automotive Plating Corp., 170 N.L.R.B. 1234 (1968), enforced, 454 F.2d 17 (2d
Cir. 1972). See generally Comment, Unfair Representation and the National Labor Relations8 5Board: A Functional Analysis, 37 J. AIR L. & CoM. 89, 105-07 (1971).
NLRB v. C & C Plywood Corp., 385 U.S. 421 (1967).
8"Automotive Plating Corp., 183 N.L.R.B. No. 131, 74 L.R.R.M. 1396 (1970).
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the Supreme Court approved in Vaca v. Sipes;" and, indeed, the Second Circuit
denied enforcement.""
What meaningful remedy could the Board have ordered, given the fact that
it had no jurisdiction over the employer? Would any remedy have been appropriate in the absence of a finding of wrongful discharge? And could such a
finding have been made without the employer being a party to the action? The
most meaningful remedy, the remedy of reinstatement, could certainly not have
been achieved without jurisdiction over the employer. Ideally, in Automotive
Plating there should have been several claims for relief: one against the union,
either as an unfair labor practice charge or a separate cause of action filed in
court in the tradition of the Steele" and Hufiman" cases; and a separate claim
against the employer alleging a contract violation under section 301,1 since
the Maddox" doctrine of exhaustion of remedies had apparently been satisfied.
It is preferable that such claims against multiple parties be joined in a single
proceeding in order that complete relief, including reinstatement if the contract
has been violated, may be awarded. If the action had been filed in a court, the
appropriate remedy might have included a requirement for arbitration. But
under the present system of divided jurisdiction, the employee in Automotive
Plating had to choose between accepting the free legal service provided by the
General Counsel through the NLRB, which could only render inadequate
relief, or pursuing a more costly court action, which would have been handled
by his private attorney.
(b) Successorship. Another area of jurisdictional conflict is found in the
cases involving successorship in collective bargaining. The Supreme Court's
recent decision in NLRB v. Burns InternationalSecurities Services, Inc."' illustrates the folly of a system in which jurisdiction of the same subject matter is
divided among different tribunals. The NLRB in Burns had held that "absent
unusual circumstances," the national labor policy embodied in the National
Labor Relations Act "requires the successor-employer to take over and honor
a collective-bargaining agreement negotiated on behalf of the employing enterprise by the predecessor.""' The Board based its decision on John Wiley & Sons
v. Livingston, 5 in which the Court had held, in a case arising under section
'" "The governing principle . . . is to apportion liability between the employer and the
union according to the damage caused by the fault of each. Thus, damages attributable solely
to the employer's breach of contract should not be charged to the union, but increases if
any in those damages caused by the union's refusal to process the grievance should not be
charged to the employer." Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 197 (1967).
" NLRB v. Local 485, Int'l Union of Elec. Workers, 454 F.2d 17 (2d Cit. 1972). The
initial order of the Board requiring the Union to process the employees' wrongful discharge
grievance was upheld. The court denied enforcement of the supplemental Board order for
full back pay under the rule of Vaca which calls for apportioning liability for the employee's
damage between the union and the employer based on the damage each caused. Yet the
court raised the question of whether the Supreme Court's decision of Czosek v. O'Mara, 397
U.S. 25 (1970), had altered the apportionment test of Vaca which seems to limit a local's
liability. Id. at 23.
" Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
'Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953).
" Labor Management Relations Act § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970).
"Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965).
"192 S.Ct. 1571 (1972).
"Burns Int'l Detective Agency, Inc., 182 N.L.R.B. No. 50, 74 L.R.R.M. 1098, 1100-01
(1970).
" 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
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301,"6 that a successor employer was obligated to arbitrate pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement which had been negotiated and agreed to by the
predecessor employer, notwithstanding that the successor employer was not a
party to the agreement.
In deciding that Burns had committed a per se refusal to bargain, in violation of section 8 (a) (5), by refusing to honor its predecessor's collective agreement, the NLRB showed little understanding of the parallel problems involving arbitration under section 301, as to which the Board, of course, had no
jurisdiction. The NLRB, in holding that Burns was bound to its predecessor's
contract "as if it were a signatory thereto,""t was relegating to itself the task
of deciding which agreements applied to which successors. Seemingly oblivious
of the role of the arbitrator under the Wiley decision, the Board indicated that
"absent unusual circumstances" the successor would be bound to the entire
contract. If the NLRB were to find unusual circumstances, however, the employer would be bound by no part of the agreement, which obviously meant
he would not be bound even by a provision requiring arbitration." The Second
Circuit reversed that part of the Burns decision which held that the employer
was bound to honor its predecessor's collective bargaining agreement. It did
not reverse the finding of refusal to bargain based on Burns' refusal to recognize the incumbent union as the bargaining agent for its employees." ' The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court."°
This is not the occasion to embark on a detailed analysis of the Justices'
opinions in Burns. One feature of the majority opinion, however, is especially
relevant to the focus of this Article. Although the Court disagreed with the
Board, it, too, fell into the trap of viewing the issue solely as one involving
unfair labor practices. It is regrettable that the procedural and appellate structure applicable to arbitration and section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act is entirely separate from the structure applicable to sections
8(a) (5) and 8(b)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act. The Court, in
its zeal to reverse the NLRB, contributed new confusion to the meaning of
Wiley in the context of section 301 enforcement and the duty to arbitrate.
True, the court restated the Wiley holding to the effect that the agreement to
arbitrate "survived the merger and left to the arbitrator, subject to judicial
review, the ultimate question of the extent to which, if any, the surviving
1 1
company was bound by other provisions of the contract.""
The Court then
proceeded, however, to stress Wiley's "narrower holding [which] dealt with a
merger occurring against a background of state law,"1 2' and ignored Wiley
entirely in presenting the rationale as to why, under section 8(a) (5) the

"Labor Management Relations Act § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 105 (1970).
1174 L.R.R.M. at 1101.
"SIn Emerald Maintenance, Inc., 188 N.L.R.B. No. 139, 76 L.R.R.M. 1437 (1970), the
Board found the unusual circumstances because the successor was operating under a limitedterm government contract. Thus, the employees lost their entire agreement, including the
grievance procedure.
99441 F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1971).
"'092 S.Ct. 1571 (1972).
1
' 1Id.
at 1581.
102 Id.
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successor employer should not be "saddled" with the terms and conditions of
employment contained in the old collective bargaining agreement.
Where does this leave arbitration and section 301 judicial enforcement of
any provision, including an arbitration provision, of a predecessor's agreement
applied to a successor employer? The Court in Burns was not concerned with
that problem. But the two problems are related, indeed they may be the same.
They only appear different because parties to labor agreements in such cases
must exercise choices as to both law and forum, and one choice generally precludes the other.
Burns and other successorship cases furnish additional proof of the need for
one tribunal to have combined jurisdiction to determine both unfair labor
practice charges and section 301 claims arising from common circumstances.
As demonstrated by the jurisdictional conflicts in the successorship cases, a
single tribunal should be able to do a better job in distinguishing contractual
disputes from refusal-to-bargain disputes. At least it is reasonable to expect
that a tribunal with combined unfair labor practice and section 301 jurisdiction
would show more willingness to defer to arbitration than the NLRB has shown.
Moreover, with one tribunal having such combined jurisdiction, the conventional doctrine of res judicata becomes viable. A party would thus be bound
not only as to the claim he raises in the original action, but also as to any other
claim which he could have raised on the basis of the same fact situation."' It
is within the capability of our legal system to fashion machinery which would
accommodate such mixed claims, whether they be denominated unfair labor
practices or simply claims for judicial relief arising under federal law.
(c) Employment Discrimination.The third area of potential jurisdictional
conflict involves employment discrimination based on race, religion, or sex.
These cases demonstrate that the present system cannot satisfactorily accommodate the doctrine of res judicata. Exemplifying the inefficiency of existing procedures, and also their unfairness, was the Sixth Circuit decision in Tipler v.
duPont de Nemours & Co.'" This was an action for reinstatement and damages
brought by a discharged employee claiming racial discrimination in violation
of title VII. The employer had successfully defended against an unfair labor
practice charge by the same employee on the same facts. The employer was
next brought before the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission and
then before the federal district court on the title VII charge. Affirming the
district court, the circuit court denied the employer's plea of res judicata and
collateral estoppel, pointing out that, although the two laws are not totally
dissimilar, "their differences significantly overshadow their similarities." 105 Considering the divided jurisdiction between the Board and the courts, the appellate
court had no other meaningful choice. Its decision meant re-trying the old
facts under a new theory; an unsound practice which would not have been
necessary had the doctrine of res judicata been available. This example is an03

See 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1270
(1969); 1B J. MOORE & T. CURRIER, FEDERAL PRACTICE §§ 0.405-.422 (2d ed. 1965);
3 W. BARRON, A. HOLTZOFF & C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1246
1

(Supp. 1971).
104443 F.2d 125 (6th Cir. 1971).
13s
Id. at 128.

1972]

UNITARY LABOR LAW ENFORCEMENT

other situation, and not an unusual one, where the objectives of two separate
laws could have been reconciled and been better served if a single tribunal had
jurisdiction to hear and determine claims arising under both laws.
Congress recently amended title VII to allow the EEOC to institute enforcement actions in the federal district courts. "' There is nothing in the new amendments, however, to prevent multiplication of actions and remedies among
different tribunals and different statutes. If anything, the conflicts will
probably increase simply because the volume of judicial enforcement of title
VII actions is now expected to increase.
(d) The Arbitration Process. Another conflict area, one which has existed
for some time, involves the relation of NLRB action to the arbitration process. "' In such cases the Board may not choose to defer to arbitration; the
Board's power to make determinations in unfair labor practice cases is not
affected by any other means of adjustment, including arbitration.0 " That is the
teaching of such cases as Cary v., Westinghouse Electric Corp."' and Strong

Roofing."' There is growing recognition, however, that the Board should exercise more restraint than it has previously shown in the issuance and processing
of complaints which might be handled through the parties' own grievance and
arbitration procedures."' Even if the Board has now become more receptive to
arbitration, such an effort at accommodation can be only a palliative because
the Board has no direct control over the arbitration process and no responsibility for review under section 301."'
A more fundamental revision is required. Since arbitration of grievances
concerning the application or interpretation of an existing collective bargaining
agreement is favored by the national labor policy,"' as the Supreme Court reminded us in Boys Markets,"' it would be desirable, and less destructive of
established collective bargaining, for the tribunal which has jurisdiction in an
unfair labor practice case involving arbitration and/or the interpretation of
provisions in a collective bargaining contract also to have jurisdiction over any
related section 301 issue. Such jurisdiction should, of course, be exercised within the familiar framework of Lincoln Mills"' and the Steelworker Trilogy."'
10 Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, § 4,
5(a)-(g) (1970), U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws No. 3,
1972 amendment also provides for transfer of the authority
tions. For the first two years the EEOC and the Attorney
diction to initiate such actions. Thereafter, such actions may
"'7See note 80 supra.

amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000eat 816 (Apr. 20, 1972). The
to bring pattern or practice acGeneral have concurrent jurisbe brought only by the EEOC.

480-514.
"~National Labor Relations Act S 10(a), 29 U.S.C. § 16 0(a) (1970).
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110375 U.S. 261 (1964).
"' NLRB v. Strong, d/b/a Strong Roofing & Insulating Co., 393 U.S. 357
(1969).
See also Woodlawn Farm Dairy Co., 162 N.L.R.B. 48 (1966); Great Lakes Carbon Corp.,
152 N.L.R.B. 988 (1965), enforced, 360 F.2d 19 (4th Cir. 1966).
"' Address by NLRB Chairman Miller, Jan. 22, 1971, Labor Law Conference, Louisiana
State University, in LABOR RELATIONS YEARBOOK 117 (1971).
"' In Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. No. 150, 77 L.R.R.M. 1931 (1971), the
Board indicated substantially greater deference to arbitration than it had shown in the past.

See Schatzki, NLRB Resolution of Contract Disputes under Section 8(a)(5), 50 TEXAS

L. REV.
225 (1972). See also notes 86-92 supra, and accompanying text.
" 4 Labor Management Relations Act § 203(d), 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1970); Textile
Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
"1'Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
116353 U.S. 448 (1957).
"..

United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United
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B. Other Federal Labor Laws
and the Tribunals Which Administer Them
Title VII Civil Rights Act Enforcement. An area of conflict is developing
around the degree of accommodation which should be accorded grievance
arbitrations when related actions are filed with the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission and the federal courts under title VII. Such a case was
Dewey v. Reynolds Metal Co."' Dewey was discharged for refusing either to
work on Sunday or to provide a replacement who would work on that day.
He based his refusal on religious beliefs. A grievance was submitted to contractual arbitration, and the arbitrator found that Dewey's discharge had been
justified under the collective bargaining agreement. Subsequently, Dewey requested the United States Office of Federal Contract Compliance to review
his discharge and to find that it was based on religious discrimination. The
OFCC found no basis for that charge, whereupon Dewey turned to the EEOC
and submitted a charge with that agency claiming the discharge had been
motivated by religious discrimination. The EEOC determined that there was
reasonable cause to believe that the company had engaged in unlawful employment practices in violation of title VII and authorized the filing of suit
in federal district court. The district court ruled in Dewey's favor, ordering
reinstatement with back pay and enjoining the company from requiring him to
work on Sunday. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding, inter alia, that by pursuing the grievance procedure under the agreement Dewey had made an
election of remedies which thereby precluded his bringing an action in court.
The court of appeals declared: "Where the grievances are based on an alleged
civil rights violation, and the parties consent to arbitration by a mutually agreeable arbitrator . . . the arbitrator has a right to finally determine them.""'
The Fifth Circuit in Hutchings v. United States Industries, Inc. arrived at
the opposite conclusion, holding that "[aln arbitration award, whether adverse
or favorable to the employee, is not per se conclusive of the determination of
Title VII rights by the federal courts .... ""'° Although the Supreme Court
granted certiorari in Dewey, the conflict between contract arbitration and EEOC
procedures remains unresolved, for the Court split four-to-four, affirming without opinion the Sixth Circuit decision. Although each federal district court
already has jurisdiction under both title VII and section 301, if there were a
single judicial body charged with specialized jurisdiction over the major areas
of labor relations it is conceivable that earlier resolution would be provided for
the type of problem that Dewey and Hutchings illustrate.
There were numerous shortcomings in the enforcement procedures provided
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers
v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
"'429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), afl'd, 402 U.S. 689 (1971) (by an equally divided
Court); see Blumrosen, Labor Arbitration, EEOC Conciliation, and Discrimination in Employment, 24 ARB. J. (n.s.) 88 (1969); Meltzer, Labor Arbitration and Overlapping and
Conflicting Remedies for Employment Discrimination, 39 U. CHI. L. REV. 30 (1971);
Peck, Remedies for Racial Discrimination in Employment: A Comparative Evaluation of
Forums, 46 WASH. L. REV. 455 (1971).
19429 F.2d at 332. But see Rios v. Reynolds Metals Co., 332 F. Supp. 1209 (S.D. Tex.
1971).

1-0428 F.2d 303, 311 (5th Cir. 1970).
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by the original title VII.'' In particular, reliance on private litigation, except
perhaps in pattern-of-practice cases, meant that enforcement for some employees was difficult, and for others it was non-existent."' Strong pressures
were exerted in Congress to improve the enforcement procedures." Only
weeks before passage of the 1972 amendments, the approach which seemed to
24
be most widely favored was to confer cease-and desist power upon the EEOC.
Such a solution would have traded one set of problems for another. The creation of another independent agency, with jurisdiction overlapping that of the
NLRB and the lower courts in such areas as contract enforcement and fair
representation, would have compounded the present jurisdictional problems
even further.
What ultimately emerged from Congress may, in the long run, prove almost
as unwieldy. As previously noted, Congress gave the EEOC authority to bring
its own enforcement actions in the federal district courts. Should the courts
become sufficiently clogged, should differences in interpretation and remedy
among the various courts go unresolved for too long a period, and should
jurisdictional overlaps and conflicts with NLRB action or arbitration awards
increase, there may once again develop a recognized need for another approach
to the enforcement of title VII. But the 1972 amendments will probably improve the record for enforcement of title VII, although this record may be
achieved at the expense of other laws which also govern the employment relationship.
The state of labor law enforcement thus continues to be analogous to the
six blind men touching and describing an elephant. The subject matter of
employee relations, from the standpoint of the agencies and tribunals which
enforce the many legal principles applicable to those relations, tends to be
viewed as fragmented, unrelated parts, each bearing a different label: unfair
labor practices; unfair employment practices (title VII discrimination);
breaches of the duty of fair representation; grievances under collective agreements; or miscellaneous judicial actions for damages and injunctive relief. A
unitary system of enforcement which would interrelate these parts, and thereby
identify and vitalize the elephant-like subject matter of the various laws which
regulate employee relations, would be a wiser course for EEOC reform, and for
labor law reform generally."
121 See Developments in the Law-Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1109 (1971).
122 E.g., the experience of one district EEOC office (Dallas, Texas) indicates the following case disposition percentages (working estimates) : Of the "total number of charges filed"
(TNCF), approximately 50% show "reasonable cause" the law has been violated after an
investigation of the facts. Of this number, approximately 50% (25% TNCF) are successfully conciliated to the complete satisfaction of the respondent employer and the employee
charging party. For the remainder (25% TNCF), there is no completely satisfactory conciliation-15 to 25% (4% to 6% TNCF) of this group go to court; 75 to 85% (19%
to 21% TNCF) of this group go without any remedy, although in this number are some
instances where the employer has partially complied with the EEOC requested remedy. Interview with Mr. Gene R. Renslow, Dallas District Director of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, in Dallas, Texas, Sept. 18, 1971.
'12E.g., Ereleborn Bill, H.R. 6760, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); Hawkins Bill, H.R.
1746, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
"54Williams Bill, S. 2515, 92 Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); Hawkins Bill, H.R. 1746, 92d
Cong.,5 1st Sess. (1971).
'" See Morris, supra note 3. See also Northrup, Will Greater EEOC Powers Expand

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 26

Pension Plans. Another area of conflicting jurisdiction involves employment
pension plans. Such plans have long been subject to the mandatory bargaining
obligation of section 8(a) (5) of the NLRA."2' Pension plans which result
from, or are subject to, a collective bargaining agreement are enforceable contracts." When such a plan is expressly referred to in a collective bargaining
agreement, a suit brought on the plan may be considered a suit under section
301 of the LMRA to which federal law would apply,"8 and arbitration under
that agreement should be applicable.""
Such plans are primarily subject to the requirements of section 302 of the
LMRA. But federal district courts, in fact, also have jurisdiction, under section
301 of the LMRA, to review section 302 pension fund agreements and their
administration. Exercising such jurisdiction, one court has allowed a class action
by a committee of pensioned miners against the union to force the union as
trustee to sue the mine operators for delinquent royalty payments due the
retired miners as beneficiaries under the fund.' Another court has struck down
a "signatory last employment" clause as arbitrary and without rational basis,
since it operated to deny pension benefits to an applicant who retired from an
employer, non-signatory to a trust fund agreement, despite his previous employment by signatory employers who had made substantial contributions into
the fund on his behalf.""
Until recently, the picture was further complicated by an NLRB holding
that retired persons were employees for whom the employer must bargain
collectively with the union concerning retirement benefits. The Sixth Circuit reversed that holding and the Supreme Court affirmed.'
Obviously, the interrelation of these several statutes-not to mention the
lingering impact of state law-suggests the advantage which might accrue
from centering cases involving employee pension plans in a single tribunal
with jurisdiction broad enough to adjudicate all the different issues.
Railway Labor Act Deficiencies. The Railway Labor Act' is another statute
which stands in need of reform. One of the infirmities from which that Act
Minority Employment, Proceedings of Industrial Relations Research Association, 22 LAB.

L.J. 513 (1971).

12"E.g., Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 77 N.L.R.B. 1, enforced, 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir.
1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 960 (1949).
32 See, e.g., Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962); Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp., 361 U.S. 459 (1960).
121 See Goetz, Current Problems in Application of Federal Labor Law
to Welfare and

Pension Plans, in

SOUTHWESTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION,

LABOR LAW DEVELOPMENTS-

16TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE 107, 130, 139 (1970); Goetz, Developing Federal Labor Law
of Welfare and Pension Plans, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 911 (1970).
12"But see In re Mobil Oil Co., 43 Lab. Arb. 1287 (1965), Turkus, Arbitrator, holding
that the parties could not rely on the arbitration clause in the collective bargaining agreement unless it incorporated the pension plan by reference. See also Sigismondi v. Queens
Transit Corp., 73 L.R.R.M. 2479 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1969). The court took the position that
pension plan disputes between an employer and the union were not arbitrable unless there
was either an express arbitration provision in the plan or it was sufficiently incorporated into
the collective bargaining agreement containing an arbitration clause.
'Thomas
v. Honeybrook Mines, Inc., 428 F.2d 981 (3d Cir. 1970).
13 Roark v. Boyle, 439 F.2d 497 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
. 2 Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. NLRB, 177 N.L.R.B. 911 (1969), enforcement denied,

427 F.2d 936 (6th Cir. 1970), af§'d, 404 U.S. 157 (1971).
3'Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C.

§5

151-63, 181-88 (1970).
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suffers is that its enforcement depends primarily upon local federal district
courts even though limited areas are by law carved out for separate determination by the National Mediation Board," by the various adjustment boards,"
and by the Civil Aeronautics Board. " Just as the Tower bill... would give
enforcement of the substantive provisions of the NLRA to the regular federal
district courts, the RLA already confers similar jurisdiction on these trial courts.
The result is not a happy one."8 The result may prove to be even more unhappy if the Supreme Court's decision in the Chicago & Northwestern case.'.
stimulates a rash of new cases in which various United States district courts
are called upon to determine: (1) Whether a union or a carrier is exerting
under section 2(First) of the Act "every reasonable effort to make and maintain"' a collective bargaining agreement (i.e., bargaining in good faith);
(2) whether a strike or other economic action initiated by one of the parties
constitutes a breach of that obligation; and (3) whether an injunction should
issue if such a breach is found.
The task which Chicago & Northwestern imposes on the district courts is
but typical of the many complex doctrines which hundreds of non-specialized
federal judges have long been required to apply to the railways and airlines
and to their employees and unions. The absence of a concentration of judicial
experience under the RLA at the trial court level impedes development of a
comprehensible body of law under this statute and renders its enforcement unduly difficult.'
Another serious defect in the enforcement of the RLA is the absence of an
officer comparable to the NLRB's General Counsel charged with prosecuting
cases arising under the substantive provisions of the statute. Such an officer is
especially needed to enforce individual employee rights, including rights involving breach of a union's duty of fair representation.'
Among the other deficiencies that relate to the administration of the RLA
are the following: The National Mediation Board is reluctant--or unableto establish more realistic bargaining units, especially in the airline industry.'
The hearing procedures (or absence of procedures in many instances) in NMB
representation cases are less satisfactory than those which the NLRB maintains
in representation cases under its jurisdiction.'" Serious conflicts exist among
'"Railway
Labor Act § 4, 5, 10, 45 U.S.C. § 154, 155, 160 (1970).
3
" 'Railway Labor Act, § 3, 204, 45 U.S.C. §5 153, 184 (1970).
"3 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 401(k)(4),
49 U.S.C. § 1371(k)(4) (1970).
See generally
Note, CAB and Labor Jurisdiction, 33 J. AIR L. & COM. 334 (1967).
7
" S. 3671, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
"s See Morris, supra note 3, at 546, 552. The absence of a single decisional authority
other than the Supreme Court has also contributed to the confusion regarding the respective
roles3 of courts and boards in the resolution of disputes based on statutory violations.
. Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. United Transp. Union, 402 U.S. 570 (1971).
'"Railway Labor Act § 2(First), 45 U.S.C. § 152(First) (1970).
'"' See Morris, supra note 3, at 552.
" Id. at 553.
" Id. at 551. See also Harlan, Developments: Past and Future in the NMB's Determination of "Craft or Class," 35 J. AIR L. & CoM. 394 (1969); Heisler, Inconsistencies of
the National Mediation Board in Its Interpretation and Definition of the Terms: Craft or

Class, 35 J. AIR L.& CoM. 408 (1969).
'See
Employees
CoM. 468
CoM. 420

Morris, supra note 3, at 551. See also Curtin, The Representation Rights of
and Carriers: A Neglected Area Under the Railway Labor Act, 35 J. AIR L. &
(1969); Goulard, The Employee's "Free and Clear Choice," 35 J. Am L. &
(1969).
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various RLA tribunals in the determination of inter-union jurisdictional disputes. The mingling within the same agency of the NMB's mediatory role with
its quasi-adjudicatory role, which it exercises in representation cases, hinders
fulfillment of both roles." The cumbersome and fairly inflexible procedures
which have been developed under the RLA contribute to the stifling of collective bargaining under that statute.14
It has become commonplace to criticize labor relations under the Railway
Labor Act, and various reform proposals have been advanced.147 However, the
most serious problems under the existing statute stem more from inflexible and
unwieldy administrative devices created by or developed under the statute than
from any shortcomings in the substantive duties which the statute imposes.
When one considers the traditional attachment of both management and unions
to the RLA--despite its shortcomings-it is apparent that procedural reform
will be easier to achieve than outright repeal. But if it would be a mistake to
create another NLRB to enforce title VII, it would be an even greater
mistake to confer Taft-Hartley Act coverage of railroads and airlines on the
present NLRB. There is nothing in the NLRB's record of coping with its
present jurisdiction that would indicate a capability for handling the complicated collective bargaining problems which are common to the railroads and
the airlines.
If enforcement of the Railway Labor Act were given to the same tribunals
which are charged with enforcement of parallel provisions of the Taft-Hartley
Act, in time a unified body of substantive labor law for all industry in the
private sector might be attained."' The need for procedural reform under the
RLA is so urgent that the time may be ripe to devise and establish common
procedures to provide more effective administration for both the RLA and the

NLRA, along with the administration of other federal statutes regulating
employee relations.
Other Relevant Federal Statutes. Included among the other federal statutes

which regulate employee relations are the Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act of 1959 (the Landrum-Griffin Act),14' the various wage and
hour laws," the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,"' and the
Veterans' Reemployment Act."'
"4 See Morris, supra note 3, at 552.
"'Id.at 554.
"47See, e.g., Redenius, Airlines: The Railway Labor Act or the Labor Management Relations Act?, 20 LAB. L.J. 293 (1969); Symposium on Air Transportation Relations, 35 J.
AIR L. & CoM. 313 (1969). Note in particular, Aaron, Comments on Papers Presented
at the Symposium on Air Transport Labor Relations at 513-20. "With varying degrees of
intensity, the speakers have expressed dissatisfaction with the application of the Railway
Labor Act to airlines. . . . Suggested remedial measures have ranged from modest proposals
for more research into existing practices to bold recommendations for a complete reorganization of labor law administration, including the creation of a labor court. . . . My own
view, repeatedly stated for some time past, is that the Railway Labor Act has outlived its
usefulness and should be repealed."
148See Morris, supra note 3, at 559-74.
14929 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1970).
.. See note 21 supra.

15129 U.S.C. § 621-34 (1970).
"'150 U.S.C. § 459 (1970).
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A case could be made for inclusion of the enforcement procedures of each
of these statutes, and perhaps others,15 within a unitary judicial system designed primarily for administration of the Taft-Hartley Act, the Railway Labor
Act, and title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. The advisability of including
these additional statutes with the three statutes, which I have here arbitrarily
designated as primary, would be predicated on two premises: (1) the closely
related nature of the subject matter of their coverage makes them ideal for
administration by a unitary judicial system, and (2) a unitary judicial system
could provide a specialized forum ideally suited by experience and outlook to
handle enforcement problems arising under an interrelated set of laws. Inclusion of the additional statutes, however, might well await demonstration of
successful administration of the three primary statutes in the proposed unitary
system." 4

II. AN APPRAISAL OF THE SCENE
The scene presented by the foregoing survey of enforcement problems besetting the nation's principal labor laws is one of confusion and frustration. It
is a picture of inefficient administration and inadequate compliance; a jurisdictional nightmare of overlapping and conflicting decisions. There exists a
tableau of never-ending campaigns to achieve accommodation among separate
tribunals with related but different areas of interest.
We have witnessed the NLRB as a bull in the china shop of contractual

rights, for the NLRB has no direct jurisdiction over contractual disputes and
no claim to special expertise in handling such disputes. On the other hand, the
NLRB can legitimately claim some expertise in its primary role of protector
of the organizational rights of employees and enforcer of the collective bargaining process. The Board's chief problem in that role, however, is its lack of

adequate process.
The jurisdictional picture in fair representation and minority discrimination
cases is especially depressing. The minority employee has available to him a
variety of laws and tribunals, but the remedy that he finally obtains from
these tribunals is often inadequate. An aggrieved minority employee who
claims discrimination may seek out the NLRB in a fair representation action if
a union is involved, or he may file suit in state or federal court in the same
situation; or, if the employer is also involved, the employee might attempt
arbitration under a collective bargaining contract and then seek enforcement
of his contractual rights in a judicial action under section 301. More likely,
" See note 209 infra.
'See Morris, supra note 3, at 568-73. Inclusion of these other statutes might be advisable for the additional reason that the regular federal district courts are overcrowded and
a transfer of jurisdiction of cases under these statutes to a specialized court would relieve
some of the congestion. Conditions relating to these other statutes, standing alone, would
not justify establishment of a specialized labor court; but in view of the critical enforcement
problems which do exist under the primary labor statutes, consideration should be given
to establishing a court system with jurisdiction that would eventually cover substantially
all federal labor statutes. By operation of the familiar doctrine of federal preemption, there
would be little if any private sector labor relations to be exercised by the state courts under
the plan here envisioned. Cf. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236
(1959).
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however, he will pursue the title VII route through a state agency or the EEOC,
then proceed to federal court, either in an action brought by the EEOC or
in a private action, unless his interests are included in a pattern or practice case.
Some minority employees might choose to bypass the EEOC and seek direct
judicial enforcement of the right to contract for employment without discrimination pursuant to the 1866 Civil Rights Act. Another forum might be the
Department of Labor and its Office of Federal Contract Compliance, in which
the employee would assert his rights under the Presidential executive order
relating to employment by government contractors and subcontractors."' Notwithstanding the availability of these many forums, effective remedies for
employment discrimination based on race and sex have so far proven to be
quite illusive."'
III.

PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE: A UNITARY SYSTEM
FOR THE ADMINISTRATION AND ENFORCEMENT

OF FEDERAL LABOR LAW IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR

A. Other Proposals
Various alternatives have been advanced to improve the functioning of the
existing agencies. It has been suggested that the unfair labor practice jurisdiction of the NLRB be transferred to the federal district courts," ' and also that

the NLRB be converted into a legislative court somewhat similar in structure
to the Tax Court, with judges serving for extended terms."' Another proposal
recommends retaining the Board but giving it certiorari-type review over trial
examiners' decisions and making Board orders self-enforcing." 9 There are
also proposals to confer cease-and-desist power on the EEOC,00 and proposals
to repeal substantial parts of the Railway Labor Act and bring railroads and
1
airlines under the Taft-Hartley jurisdiction.""
These and many other recommendations for patches and palliatives to be applied to existing structures
have been much debated.'' It is not my purpose to add debate to debate. It is
sufficient simply to note a fundamental deficiency common to all of them: Each
proposal repeats the errors of the blind men describing the elephant and fails
to treat the interrelated subjects of labor law as a whole. Many of the proposals
would probably provide some limited improvement over the present situation, 6'
"'Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1967), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970).
..See Developments in the Law-Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARv. L. REv. 1109, 1163, 1195-1259 (1971); Peck, Remedies for Racial Discrimination in Employment: A Comparative Evaluation of Forums, 46
WASH. L. REv. 455, 458-66 (1971). It is too early to appraise the success of the recent
amendments to title VII. Although the volume of enforcement actions is likely to increase
as a result of the new EEOC authority to bring direct judicial actions, congestion in the
federal district courts is also likely to increase. See text accompanying notes 124, 125 supra.
"..Tower Bill, S. 3671, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
" Griffin Bill, S. 103, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
"..Thompson Bill, H.R. 7152, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
"~See note 124 supra, and accompanying text.
"O0
Griffin-Dole Bill, S. 560, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
'Address by George B. Driesen, May 19, 1970, Second Annual Collective Bargaining
Forum, New York City, in LABOR RELATIONS YEARBOOK 228 (1970); Booker & Coe,
The NLRB and Its Critics, 17 LAB. L.J. 522 (1966). See also Lyne, The National Lahor
Relations Board and Suggested Alternatives, 22 LAB. L.J. 408 (1971).
"'E.g., Thompson Bill, H.R. 7152, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
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but others might even reduce the degree of compliance from that now
achieved."' None would get at the root of the overall problem.
B. A Unitary System
The acute need for change within all the primary areas of labor law jurisdiction is sufficient to suggest that enforcement of these related statutory areas
be entrusted to a coordinated and unified system. The devising of such a coherent regulatory mechanism will require the delicate blending of proper kinds
and quantities of judicial and administrative authority. Innovation will be
essential. There will be constitutional pitfalls to be avoided, particularly concerning the task of separating judicial function from legislative or executive
function. However, the Supreme Court has already provided support for the
basic plan here proposed, for it has recognized the constitutionality of a specialized article III court." 5 Such a court is the keystone of the unitary system herein recommended. Labor law seems ideally suited for this bold venture.
Three years ago I advanced the proposition of a program of procedural reform in labor law which had as its core a specialized article III court.'" That
'"E.g., Tower Bill, S. 3671, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
...
The Supreme Court paved the way for Congress to establish an article III court of
specialized and limited jurisdiction in Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962). The
Court there gave effect to a congressional declaration that the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals was a "court established under Article III." The Supreme Court stated that "Congress has never been compelled to vest the entire jurisdiction provided for in Article III
upon inferior courts of its creation." 370 U.S. at 561. This holding was reaffirmed in Brenner v. Mason, 383 U.S. 519 (1966). The Court specifically declared that because the Court
of Customs and Patent Appeals was an article III court, its order was judicial in character
and "final and binding in the usual sense." 383 U.S. at 526. The Court in Glidden also
held that the same reasoning is applicable to the Court of Claims. The courts of the District
of Columbia, though "hybrid" as to their jurisdiction, also exercise judicial authority under
article III. See O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516 (1933); Hobson v. Hansen,
265 F. Supp. 902 (D.D.C. 1967); C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS, 10-11, 26-33
(2d ed. 1970); Comment, The District of Columbia Courts.- Judicial or Legislative?, 58
NW. U.L. REV. 401 (1963). For a discussion of additional federal courts having specialized
geographical jurisdiction, for example, the District Court for the District of Puerto Rico,
see C. WRIGHT, supra, at 10-11.
Other specialized article III courts have been created but later abolished. The most
controversial and short-lived was the Commerce Court, which had jurisdiction to review
decisions of the Interstate Commerce Commission. It was established in 1910 and abolished
in 1913. Dix, The Death of the Commerce Court: A Study in Institutional Weakness, 8 AM.
J. LEG. HIST. 238 (1964). The Emergency Court of Appeals, which had jurisdiction to
review orders of the Price Control Administration, was created during World War II and
was abolished in 1953. C. WRIGHT, supra, at 12. A similar Emergency Court of Appeals,
having review jurisdiction over cases arising under the current wage and price stabilization
program, was established in S 211(b) of the Economic Stabilization Act Amendments of
1971, Pub. L. No. 92-210, in 1 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 844 (1971). The judges
for this court are drawn from other federal benches by appointment by the Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court.
It is fair to observe that specialized courts, unlike specialized administrative boards,
have not yet achieved great popularity in this country. There is some indication, however,
that the complexities and pressures of modern society may force some rethinking about the
use of this type of court to improve law enforcement. See, e.g., Report of Special Advisory
Group on Federal Civil Litigation (Robert A. Leflar, Chairman), which has recommended
creation of special courts for antitrust and other trade regulation cases. The Push To Streamline the Courts, BUSINESS WEEK, Dec. 4, 1971, at 46.
1',See Morris, supra note 3, at 560-62. Though the label "labor court"-means different
things to different people, let us not be frightened by the tyranny of labels. The labor court
which I recommend is neither a legislative court to be substituted for the National Labor
Relations Board nor an Americanized version of any of the several European labor courts
which exist primarily to settle "rights disputes." For a discussion of European labor courts,
see LABOR COURTS AND GRIEVANCE SETTLEMENT IN WESTERN EUROPE (B. Aaron ed.
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program, characterized as a "working hypothesis," was at that time primarily
designed for the administration of the Taft-Hartley Act and the Railway Labor
Act, although the possibility of extending it to other related statutes, including
title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, was noted."6 7 Further study and reflection
about that program have reconfirmed my view that development of a unitary
system is the most logical way to achieve substantial improvement in both
compliance and enforcement under the federal labor laws." 8 Moreover, the
experience under title VII, which produced the recent congressional effort to
strengthen the procedural arm of the EEOC, suggests that it would also be
desirable to treat title VII ills together with the older and more familiar ailments that have long plagued the administration of the Taft-Hartley and Railway Labor Acts.
The administration of public laws designed primarily to protect employees
requires the use of agency action. Hence, certain administrative machinery
should be retained but modified. It is commonly accepted that an administrative
board can determine questions concerning representation (e.g., decide appropriate bargaining units or conduct elections) better than a court. Likewise,
mediation functions are peculiarly non-judicial in nature and thus require an
administrative organization. An administrative general counsel-or public
prosecutor-should be available to furnish investigatory and prosecutory services for alleged statutory violations. But a court is needed to provide a judicial
forum and a strong judicial process. These administrative and judicial elements
comprise the core structure of the proposed unitary system.
Stated briefly, this system would consist of a constitutional court with jurisdiction over the enforcement of the substantive rights and duties contained in the
Labor-Management Relations Act, the Railway Labor Act, title VII of the
1964 Civil Rights Act, and perhaps other federal labor laws."' The court might
appropriately be called the United States Labor Court. Complementing this
judicial structure would be a revised administrative structure. With regard to
the three named statutes, a merger of both personnel and function of existing
agencies would produce two new agencies and a new office for investigation
and prosecution:
1971); Aaron, Labor Courts: Western European Models and Their Significance for the
United States, 16 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 847 (1969); Fleming, The Labor Court Idea, 65 MICH.
L. REV. 1551 (1967).
167See Morris, supra note 3, at 560 n.154.
168 Consider the recent comment of NLRB Chairman Miller before the Thompson Committee:
Thus far in our history we have seen fit to let each of these policies be administered and adjudicated by independently isolated administrative and
judicial bodies. This has a potential . . . of creating multiplicity of litigation
even to the point of harassment of respondents. . . . [IJf the Congress is
seriously to consider action designed to produce a truly modern and effective
labor judiciary, might it . . . be time now to establish some kind of consolidated or coordinated labor judiciary, both in order to achieve a consistent
and unified administration of Federal policy and in order to avoid multiplicity
of litigation over complaints growing out of the same conduct by a single
alleged offender. . . . [W]e should be looking to develop a labor judiciary
adequate not only to overcome our immediate problems, but adequate also
to the total needs of our time.
Miller, supra note 13, at 23-24.
189 See notes 16-24 supra, and accompanying text.
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(1) The representation functions of the National Labor Relations Board
and the National Mediation Board would be combined for handling by a
single board, which could be called the National Labor Representation Boarda new NLRB.
(2) The mediation functions of both the National Mediation Board and the
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service would be merged into a single
mediation agency, which might be called the National Mediation Service-the
NMS.
(3) The General Counsel of the NLRB would be retained, but the scope
of his jurisdiction would be expanded to include authority to investigate, issue
complaints, and prosecute actions under the Railway Labor Act and title VII,
as well as under the NLRA. This additional authority would not require merger
of function or personnel for any agency under the Railway Labor Act, though
a merger of the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission and its regional
offices with the office of the NLRB General Counsel and the regional offices
of the National Labor Relations Board would be required. The new office
would also prosecute pattern-or-practice cases under title VII.70 By virtue of
his expanded jurisdiction, the holder of this new office should perhaps be
called the General Labor Counsel-a more accurate identification of the broad
functions of the proposed new position.
IV.

COMPONENTS OF THE UNITARY SYSTEM

A. The United States Labor Court
Jurisdiction.The jurisdiction of this article III court would cover the enforcement of rights and duties under the three primary labor statutes, the LaborManagement Relations Act, the Railway Labor Act, and title VII of the 1964
Civil Rights Act, but it could also include enforcement of other statutes."'
Jurisdiction under the LMRA would cover not only unfair labor practices
under section 8 of the NLRA,'' but also sections 208, 209, and 210"' (the
provisions relating to fact-finding and injunctions in national emergency disputes), section 301... (the provision for judicial enforcement of labor agreements), section 302' ' (the section relating to restrictions on payments to employee representatives), and section 303'' (the secondary boycott damage suit
provisions). Jurisdiction under the Railway Labor Act would be essentially the
same as that now exercised by the regular United States district courts. In like
manner, jurisdiction under title VII would also be transferred from the regular
federal district courts to the United States Labor Court.
Judges. Inasmuch as the court would be organized under article III of the
Constitution, its permanent judges would have life tenure and would be appointed with the advice and consent of the Senate. These appointments could
17 For an alternative plan for title VII, see note 188 infra.

'E.g.,
112
29

Age Discrimination
Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621-34 (1970).
U.S.C.
§ 158(a), (b)in Employment
(1970).
'M29 U.S.C. § 178-80 (1970).
'7429 U.S.C. § 185 (1970).
17529 U.S.C. § 186 (1970).
17'29 U.S.C. § 187 (1970).

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 26

pose a serious problem of political imbalance if made all at the same time or if
all or most of them were made by one President. Such an imbalance might be
avoided if the appointments were spread over three presidential terms. These
incremental increases in the number of judges would also be matched by corresponding incremental increases in the court's jurisdiction. A timetable that
might achieve considerable political balance in the initial appointments, and
also provide for a gradual transfer of jurisdiction from the tribunals of original jurisdiction while the court gains in both size and experience, is here
suggested.
A court of thirteen judges is proposed. The number is arbitrary. It is based
on sheer speculation as to how many judges will be needed; and the need will
be contingent on how the court is organized, the extent to which it makes use
of adjunct judges (commissioners), and the amount of litigation which will
be either generated or discouraged by the new system. The full complement of
thirteen judges would not be attained for a period of from six to nine years,
depending on the date of the enabling legislation in relation to the incumbent
President's term of office. Only five of the judges would be appointed immediately. The next four judges would be appointed during the first year of
the next presidential term, and the last four judges would be appointed during
the first year of the following presidential term. The appointments-all subject
to close senatorial scrutiny-would thus be made by either two or three different Presidents. Since appointments would be national in scope, the political
pressures at work would be oriented to the national rather than to the state
or sectional level; the exercise of senatorial courtesy would thus be minimized
if not altogether eliminated.'77 This process is calculated to produce a bench of
highly qualified judges with varied experiences and backgrounds. Should the
need for more judges later arise, Congress could of course authorize the appointment of additional judges.
Acquisition of Jurisdiction. The full statutory jurisdiction of the court would
be acquired in three stages over the same six-to-nine-year period during which
judicial appointments are made. 7' There are various combinations of statutory
increments which could effect a reasonably smooth and satisfactory transfer of
jurisdiction to the new court. One such plan is offered here. Immediate jurisdiction would be conferred over the principal statutory areas over which the
United States district courts already have jurisdiction; i.e., over title VII actions,
over enforcement of Railway Labor Act provisions, over actions under section
'..NLRB Chairman Miller, testifying before the Thompson Committee, said "[A]ny
reconstituted labor judiciary, to be truly effective, must not only be impartial but also appear
to be impartial and the parties who appear before it must have faith and confidence in
its impartiality." Miller, supra note 13, at 293.
' An alternative plan would be to confer the full statutory jurisdiction initially on the
new court, but to have the appointment of the permanent judges still spread over three
presidential terms in the manner set forth in the text. Under this plan it would be necessary
to make heavy use of temporary judges borrowed from other federal benches in order to
assist the regular judges of the court in handling the docket. This alternative approach
might be more easily abused with one-sided political packing of the court than would
be the case under the plan set out in the text. The alternative has the advantage, however,
of effecting a speedy transfer of jurisdiction, and it eliminates problems that might arise
from a lame-duck Labor Board. On balance, this writer favors the plan in the text, for it
also encourages judicial specialization, thought to be an advantage in the field of labor law.

19721

UNITARY LABOR LAW ENFORCEMENT

301 of the LMRA, over the issuance of temporary injunctive relief under
sections 10(j) and 10(1) of the NLRA,"7' and over enforcement of sections
302 and 303 of the LMRA.
Notwithstanding these limits, the court could exercise pendent jurisdiction
over any action which would ultimately be included in its regular jurisdiction.!"
The court, of course, would have complete discretion as to whether it would
assert jurisdiction over the unfair labor practice charge, to avoid abuse by a
party who might seek to extend jurisdiction through joinder of an unfair labor
practice charge with a frivolous or minor claim under the court's direct and
immediate jurisdiction. It is intended that during this initial jurisdictional period
in the court's operations the National Labor Relations Board would continue
to be the principal forum to decide unfair labor practice cases. Certain types of
cases, however, would be especially appropriate for the exercise of pendent
jurisdiction. For example, an unfair labor practice charge alleging that a union
breached its duty of fair representation in failing to process a discharge grievance, thereby violating sections 8 (b) ( 1 ) (A), 8 (b) (2), and 8 (b) (3) of the
NLRA, could and should be joined with a possible section 301 action against
the employer and/or a judicial action against the union. This should be done
where a breach of fair representation is claimed and where the validity of the
301 claim depends, in whole or in part, upon a finding that the employer has
violated the collective agreement. Pendent jurisdiction likewise would be appropriate in a title VII case where unfair labor practices could also arise
from the same fact situation.
The court's second jurisdictional stage is reached with the appointment of
four more judges. Statutory jurisdiction would then be expanded to cover the
unfair labor practice sections of the NLRA which are primarily concerned with
the individual rights of employees: section 8(a) (1) (relating to interference
by employers with protected employee rights); section 8(b)( 1) (relating to
union interference with protected employee rights); section 8 (a) (2) (relating
to employer domination and support of labor organizations); section 8 (a) (3)
(relating to discrimination in employment practiced by employers); section
8(b) (2) (relating to union induced employment discrimination); section
8 (a) (4) (relating to protection of employees who file charges or testify under
the Act); and section 8(b) (5) (relating to excessive union initiation fees).
The court's third and final jurisdictional stage is reached when the last four
judges are appointed. The court would then acquire coverage over the remaining provisions of the NLRA. These relate generally to the forms of unlawful
activity that unions and employers might direct against each other, rather than
against employees. They include the unfair labor practices which are immediately concerned with operation of the collective bargaining process and
use of economic weapons: sections 8(a) (5) and 8(b) (3) (defining the duty
to bargain collectively); section 8(b) (4) (relating to secondary activity and
jurisdictional disputes); section 8(e) (proscribing "hot-cargo" agreements);
17929

U.S.C. §§ 160(j), 160(e) (1970).

"'UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966); Lomax v. Armstrong Cork Co., 433 F.2d
1277, 1281 (5th Cir. 1970); Lewis v. Pennington, 257 F. Supp. 815, 864 (E.D. Tenn.
1966).
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section 8(b) (7) (relating to picketing for organization and recognition);
and section 8(b) (6) (relating to "feather-bedding").
None of the lines dividing the three suggested jurisdictional increments
should be drawn too sharply, for the typical NLRB complaint case covers
several unfair labor practice sections. During the court's early years it may be
difficult to determine with precision whether certain cases should be filed with
the lame duck NLRB.' or with the United States Labor Court. The court
should have the authority to devise and announce guidelines to assist the
General Labor Counsel and other parties in the selection of the appropriate
forum.
Organizational Structure and Method of Operation. The court's method of

operation should be organized for maximum efficiency consistent with judicial
due process. It is contemplated that the court would make substantial use of
adjunct judges who would act as hearing officers in most of the contested cases.
Incumbent NLRB trial examiners would undoubtedly be eligible for selection
to these positions.
To some extent the jurisdiction and duties of the adjunct judges would
resemble that of referees in bankruptcy. 8 ' They would be invested, subject to
review by a judge of the United States Labor Court, with jurisdiction to hear
cases, make findings, and issue orders. Like referees in bankruptcy, 8 ' they
would be appointed by the court and would serve as judicial officers. "' Their
appointments would probably be for terms of six or more years. A final order
issued by an adjunct judge would be a final determination of the rights of
the parties involved in the controversy unless timely challenged by a petition
for review to a tenured judge of the court. Most, although not necessarily all,
cases would be heard initially by adjunct judges. The court, subject to statutory
requirements and guidelines, would determine its own organizational structure
and method of operation. " '
It may be assumed that the court's headquarters will be in Washington,
D.C.; however, it should have authority to sit anywhere in the United States
or its territories. Terms of court, with one or more judges and several adjunct
judges sitting, would be held regularly in major metropolitan areas. The court
would be empowered to sit and function through an adjunct judge, a single
tenured judge, in panels, or en banc. Either a single judge or an adjunct judge
could act on pleas for temporary injunctive relief. In addition to the court's
permanent judges, other federal judges would sit from time to time to aid in
handling the docket. Especially during the court's early years, before it acquires
its full complement of permanent judges, it may be necessary to make regular
1 See Morris, supra note 3, at 565.
18 11 U.S.C. 5§ 66, 67 (1970).
...
W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 55 22.05, 38.02 (14th ed. 1971); Weidhorn v. Levy,
253 U.S. 268 (1920); Mueller v. Nugent, 184 U.S. 1 (1902).
...
Although the adjunct judges would be judicial officers, their judicial authority would
be delegated from one or more of the tenured judges of the court; they would not be full
status judges in the sense of having life tenure and senatorial confirmation. They would,
however, be addressed as "judge."
185Cf. United States Court of Claims, 28 U.S.C. § 1492 (1970), which also uses a
commissioner system. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 792, 2503 (1970); U.S. CT. CL. R. 52-27.
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and extensive use of the common federal judiciary practice of borrowing judges
from other federal benches.
The congressional objective in the establishment of the court's structure
should be to allow the court sufficient operational flexibility to achieve the
most effective and efficient employment of both judges and assistant judges,
giving recognition, of course, to essential differences in their positions within
the judicial system. Advisory councils of the labor bar would naturally be called
upon to make recommendations for establishing rules of procedure and
methods of operation. Inevitably, however, some trial and error will be essential
in the development of an effectual plan of operation.
Prosecution of Actions. A key element in the proposed unitary system is that
actions in the United States Labor Court could be initiated either by the General Labor Counsel (GLC)..6 or by a private party. In most cases, however,
the private party would have to give the GLC the first opportunity to bring
the action. Initiating an action under the NLRA would be similar to the present
practice. Under the new plan, when a charge is filed with the GLC it would
be the responsibility of his office (acting, as now, through regional offices) to
conduct an investigation; his office would then either dismiss the charge or
file a complaint with the United States Labor Court, provided no settlement
had been effected. In the event of dismissal, the charging party could file and
process his own case in court-unlike the present procedure where the charging
party has no recourse after the General Counsel refuses to issue a complaint.'87
Under the suggested plan, the GLC would have the right to intervene in any
such action filed by a private party. This same procedure would be applicable
to Railway Labor Act and title VII .8 actions.
...
See text accompanying notes 196-202 infra.
...
A similar plan was included in the 1972 amendments to title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. The current procedure for filing private actions under title VII is contained
in § 706(f) (1) of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, in 3 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 817 (1972), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1970), as follows:
If a charge filed with the Commission . . . is dismissed by the Commission,
or if within one hundred and eighty days from the filing of such charge or
the expiration of any period of reference under subsection (c) or (d), whichever is later, the Commission has not filed a civil action under this section
- . . or the Commission
has not entered into a conciliation agreement to
which the person aggrieved is a party, the Commission . . . shall so notify
the person aggrieved and within ninety days after the giving of such notice
a civil action may be brought against the respondent named in the charge
(A) by the person claiming to be aggrieved or (B) if such charge was filed
by a member of the Commission, by any person whom the charge alleges
was aggrieved by the alleged unlawful employment practice.
The Civil Rights Act of 1964, title VII, § 706(k), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1970),
both in its original form and as amended in 1972, allows reasonable attorneys' fees to be
awarded by the court in its discretion, as part of the costs of the suit, to an individual plaintiff who prevails in his enforcement of the Act. Under the original Act, private suits were
allowed only after the aggrieved party as complainant had filed charges with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, and the EEOC was unable to obtain voluntary compliance. Irvin v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 308 F. Supp. 152, 161-62 (E.D. Ark. 1970); Dobbins v. Local 212, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 292 F. Supp. 413, 450 (S.D. Ohio 1968);
Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505, 521 (E.D. Va. 1968). See note 187 supra
for a description of the amended procedure. Under the proposed unitary system attorneys'
fees should also be available to the claimant after he has exhausted his remedy through the
GLC and thereafter successfully processes his own action in the Labor Court.
I" An alternative plan applicable to title VII which may be feasible, though not favored
by this writer, would be to retain the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in its

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 26

All other actions of the type which may now be brought directly in federal
district court, such as actions to enforce arbitration under section 301 and
actions for damages under section 303, could be filed directly by the private
plaintiff in the United States Labor Court. Even in these actions, however, the
GLC might be allowed to intervene if determination of the issue could affect
the interpretation or enforcement of a law for which the GLC has the primary
prosecuting responsibility.
Plenary Judicial Power. It is contemplated that within its jurisdictional coverage the new court would possess essentially the same authority, both legal
and equitable, as any United States district court regarding the issuance of
appropriate legal process, orders, and judgments. For example, the device of
dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted would be available to the court. Likewise, summary judgments,189
temporary restraining orders, and injunctions would also be available. The
court's ability to tailor and effectively supervise its remedial orders sharply
contrasts with the NLRB's lack of authority to exercise such remedial action.
No changes with regard to the Norris-La Guardia Act 9° should be necessary,
other than to effect a transfer of jurisdiction from the district courts and the
courts of appeals so that the new court could issue injunctions now authorized
by statute. After minor procedural adjustments are made to reflect the restructuring of the administrative-judicial relationship within the unitary plan, the
court would have injunctive authority under sections 10(e), 10(j), and 10(1)
of the Taft-Hartley Act. Substantial power already exists under the Railway
Labor Act 1 and under section 301 of LMRA to enjoin strikes relating to arbitrable grievances under collective bargaining contracts.' Such jurisdiction
would automatically be transferred to the labor court.
Legislative changes in judicial authority to review adjustment board awards
under the Railway Labor Act 9" and arbitration procedures and awards under
new and present form, allowing it to investigate, conciliate, and otherwise function in the
manner prescribed by title VII, except that instead of bringing its enforcement actions in the
regular federal district courts it would bring them in the United States Labor Court. This
plan would duplicate some personnel and some agency activity, and it would tend to overemphasize statutory distinctions, at least at the investigatory stages, where a given fact situation might involve violations of several laws and comprise several causes of action. It is
conceded, however, that the need for vigorous enforcement to prohibit employment discrimination against minorities is so great that an independent EEOC might be deemed desirable by some interested groups. If such a plan were adopted, however, it would be necessary to provide a suitable means to coordinate parallel activity and interests of the EEOC
and the GLC. This might not be impossible, but it would be difficult. The very existence
of two public prosecutors operating in overlapping fields of law will make coordination
hard to achieve and the operations are bound to be less efficient.
1"9 The granting of summary judgment, like the device of dismissal for failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted (see FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (6)), should be
especially useful in disposing of frivolous claims.
19047 Stat. 70, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1970).
1"1Brotherhood of Ry. Trainmen v. Chicago River & Ind. R.R., 353 U.S. 30 (1957).
"i'Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
"9 3 Sections 3(p), (q), 45 U.S.C. §§ 153(p), (q) (1970); see Gunther v. San Diego
& Ariz. E. Ry., 382 U.S. 257 (1965); International Ass'n of Machinists v. Central Airlines,
372 U.S. 682 (1963); Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. Northwest Airlines, 415 F.2d 493 (8th
Cir. 1969); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Central of Ga. Ry., 415 F.2d 404 (5th Cit.
1969).
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section 301"' are not contemplated. The present private and quasi-public
systems for settling contractual disputes would not be superseded. Indeed, it is
expected that these systems would be strengthened by the unitary approach. It
is anticipated that the United States Labor Court's broad jurisdiction over both
the collective bargaining process and the collective bargaining contract would
stimulate the development of new and flexible remedies. For example, in an
unfair labor practice proceeding under the NLRA the court would be able to
require submission of an arbitral matter to an arbitrator while retaining jurisdiction for purposes of enforcing and/or reviewing the resulting arbitration
award. The court could also refer or remand a question concerning representation to the new NLRB for its determination when appropriate. The detailed
mechanics of such referral and remand procedures will have to be worked out
in the enabling statute, by regulations, by judicial decision, or by a combination
of these means.
It is intended that the court have ample authority to fashion remedies which
would more satisfactorily achieve the congressional intent inherent in the three
primary statutes than is now possible under the present system with its divided
and inadequate powers.
Much of the court's jurisdiction would cover matters which will have initially
been submitted to subordinate tribunals-to arbitration, to an adjustment
board, or to the NLRB for determining a question concerning representation.
However, the court would possess original jurisdiction over such matters in a
judicial sense, just as it would possess original jurisdiction over all other matters
under its statutory coverage. Thus the courts of appeals would review representation or arbitration matters only in the context of appeals from orders of the
United States Labor Court. This would represent no change in the scope of
appellate review. All of the orders of the new court would be self-enforcing.
A party to an action in the United States Labor Court would be entitled to
appeal judgments and other appealable orders to a circuit court of appeals in
essentially the same manner as an appeal is now taken from an order of a
United States district court.' No change is contemplated in appellate jurisdiction. It is intended that the present jurisdiction of the court of appeals for
each of the eleven circuits be maintained. The continued scattering of appellate
review among all of the United States courts of appeals is calculated to produce a healthy cross-fertilization of judicial attitudes. The minor disadvantage
that results from differences in legal interpretations among the circuits is, in
my judgment, offset by a larger advantage. Any diversity among the circuits
should counterbalance the tendency toward over-specialized expertise which
might otherwise develop within a single court of original labor jurisdiction.
"'SeeJohn Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964); United Steelworkers v.
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior &
Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co.,
363 U.S. 564 (1960).
'This procedure in itself should reduce substantially the high incidence of appellate
review in NLRA cases. See note 72 supra. Under the present law a respondent found guilty
by the NLRB of the commission of unfair labor practices need not appeal to obtain judicial
review. A simple refusal to comply with the Board's order will cause the Board to initiate
enforcement procedures in the circuit court of appeals, where the respondent, with much
less effort and expense than would be required in an ordinary appeal, can obtain full judicial
review of the Board's decision. See generally DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 873-86.
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Final reconciliation of differences among the circuits, as under the present
system, would be the responsibility of the Supreme Court through the exercise
of its power of certiorari. It is hoped that in the long run the judicial stature
of the United States Labor Court will be deemed so substantial that under the
unitary system there would be fewer reversals on appeal than under the present
system, so that ultimately the number of appeals would also be reduced.
B. The General Labor Counsel
Functions. The statutes under consideration were designed primarily to guarantee employee rights and protections. A federal administrative officer should
be available to investigate charges of violations and to prosecute complaints
under these laws, for to leave their enforcement entirely to private litigation
would be to overlook the public's interest in maintaining the labor relations
system. Furthermore, private enforcement would mean no enforcement for substantial numbers of employees, especially those who are least able to protect
themselves. And in private litigation too often the advantage lies with the
party who can afford to hire the best legal talent-either the employer or the
union, but rarely the employee. The need for a public prosecutor in many areas
involving the public interest has long been recognized. Since its inception, the
National Labor Relations Act has provided for a General Counsel. The Fair
Labor Standards Act also provides a Wage and Hour Administrator who performs a comparable service. It is also commonplace for law enforcement to
depend on both private litigation and governmental prosecution. This has been
the pattern under the antitrust laws"' and, more recently, the pattern in school
desegregation cases." ' Under title VII, the EEOC is authorized to investigate
and conciliate, and under the 1972 amendments it now has authority to file
and prosecute actions in the federal courts."' Under the RLA, however, enforcement depends almost entirely on private litigation, although the scheme of that
Act also provides for criminal penalties which theoretically could be enforced
by the Justice Department."'
The proposed unitary system would require a new federal officer, the General Labor Counsel (GLC). He would have a threefold responsibility: To investigate charges of violations under the NLRA, the RLA, and title VII; to
attempt to achieve voluntary settlements of such charges; and to prosecute unsettled complaints which he deems meritorious. His role in the presentation of
cases in the United States Labor Court, including his right of intervention in
actions brought by private plaintiffs, has already been noted."' The GLC would,
of course, handle appellate cases in the various courts of appeals. He would also
join with the Solicitor General in the presentation of cases submitted for review
16 Sherman Antitrust Act, 26 Star. 209, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 4, 9 (1970); Clayton

Antitrust Act, 38 Stat. 730, as amended, 15 U.S.C.

15, 26 (1970).

"..Civil Rights Act of 1964, title IV, 42 U.S.C.
2000c-6, 2000c-8 (1970). See also
Civil Rights Act of 1968, title VIII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3610, 3612, 3613 (1970) (fair housing
enforcement by HEW, Justice Department, or private party).
"'Equal Employment Opportunities Act § 706(f) (1), in 3 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 817 (1972).
"'.Railway Labor Act § 2(Tenth), 45 U.S.C. § 152(Tenth) (1970). In practice, these
criminal provisions are not used, and injunctive actions by private parties are the chief
means of enforcement. See Virginia Ry. v. System Federation, No. 40, 300 U.S. 515 (1937).
"I See text accompanying notes 186, 187 supra.
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in the United States Supreme Court. Unlike the unreviewable authority of the
General Counsel of the present NLRB, the General Labor Counsel's authority
under the proposed system would be subject to an effective check, for, as noted,
complainants would have the right to initiate their own actions in the Labor
Court whenever the GLC refuses to do so.
Organizationand Personnel.Under the proposed plan, there would be a merger
of the personnel and function of the NLRB General Counsel (including the
NLRB regional offices) and the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission
(including its regional offices)."' Personnel might also be drawn from employees of the National Mediation Board since its representation function,
particularly the holding of elections under the Railway Labor Act, would be
taken over by the new National Labor Representation Board. It is anticipated
that the regional offices of the GLC would assist the new NLRB in processing
representation cases in much the same manner as under present NLRB practice,
where regional personnel, especially the regional directors, handle representation cases pursuant to delegation of authority from the National Labor Relations Board."' The basic structure and function of the NLRB regional offices
would thus be preserved, though expanded in personnel and function to cover
the additional duties under the Railway Labor Act and title VII.
The success of the GLC function is essential to the validity of the proposed
unitary plan. The office of the GLC would be so designed as to have considerable administrative flexibility in the carrying out of the day-to-day operations
under these laws. The GLC will look to the United States Labor Court for adjudication and enforcement of contested cases. And it will be the responsibility
of the GLC, pursuant to the orders of that court, to assist in achieving compliance with the court's orders and remedies.
C. The National Labor Representation Board
Functions. The National Labor Representation Board (also called the NLRB)
would be expected to determine questions concerning representation under both
the NLRA and RLA. The representation functions of the present National
Labor Relations Board and National Mediation Board would thus be merged.
The new board should be equipped to operate representation and election
procedures under both statutes with a reasonable degree of uniformity even
though the statutory language concerning representation, section 2 (Ninth) of
the RLA and section 9 of the NLRA, is different. Both allow for wide agency
discretion in the determination of "appropriate bargaining unit" or "craft
or class." There is no apparent legal reason why election procedures under both
statutes could not be made substantially identical, provided the new NLRB
should choose to make them so. If the new board were to find sufficient reasons
for making distinctions, however, the differences could be retained. This board
should certainly be well qualified to recognize basic differences affecting representation among various industries and to apply differences which are already
201 It might prove to be desirable, or at least politically expedient, during the initial
years of the new system for the EEOC personnel to carry their function under title VII as
a separate division under the GLC.
2
National Labor Relations Act S 3(b), 29 U.S.C. § 153(b) (1970).
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spelled out in the respective statutes. The exercise of informed judgment and
discretion are familiar functions in administrative law."'
Delegation of Duties. The single representation board should be able to operate
with greater uniformity and improved efficiency as a result of the merger of
personnel and certain of the functions of the present NLRB and NMB. As
previously noted, the new NLRB would presumably delegate to the office of
the new GLC certain duties relating to the determination of union representation. The regional offices could thus continue to exercise field responsibility for
both "C" (complaint) and "R" (representation) cases.
D. The National Mediation Service
Consolidation of Mediation Agencies. The unitary plan also carries over to
the mediation process. The National Mediation Board, which performs various
mediation duties under the Railway Labor Act,' would be merged with the
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service. The new service, as an independent
agency, might be called the National Mediation Service (NMS). It would perform all of the mediation functions provided for by the Labor-Management
Relations Act and the Railway Labor Act. It would also continue to assist
parties to collective bargaining contracts in the selection of neutrals to serve
on adjustment boards and as arbitrators.
Strengthening the Role of Mediation. The proposed unitary system should
strengthen the Government's role in mediation. The voluntary nature of mediation and the absence of sanctions may well be its real strength." 5 The federal
mediator has nothing to sell but his good offices, consisting primarily of his
personal ability to persuade, to listen, and to suggest.' His mediation service
is often the catalyst which makes collective bargaining work. Although mediation procedures and the conditions under which mediation is invoked differ
markedly under the LMRA and the RLA, the personalized nature of the job of
mediating is similar under both statutes. A merger of the mediation functions
of the FMCS and the NMB would thus provide an opportunity for both groups
of mediators to share valuable experiences and techniques. A single agency
would also provide a more centralized and uniform direction to the service.
The new service would be of special benefit to collective bargaining on the
railroads and the airlines. For the first time, the mediation function for these
industries would be separated from the quasi-adjudicatory function which the
NMB also performs. 7 If mediators can confine their efforts to mediation,
3

See, e.g., Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks v. Ass'n for Benefit of Non-Contract Employees,
380 U.S. 650, 668-70 (1965); Switchmen's Union v. National Mediation Bd., 320 U.S.
297 (1943). See also [1970 Supp.) K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 28.02,
W"

28.16, 30.05 (1971); L. JAFFEE, JUDICIAL
359-63, 555-64, 575-79, 586-89 (1965).

CONTROL

OF

ADMINISTRATIVE

ACTION

...
4, 5, 45 U.S.C. §§ 154, 155 (1970).
2 Railway Labor Act §
05 See generally W. SIMKIN, MEDIATION AND THE DYNAMICS OF COLLECTIVE BAR-

GAINING (1971).

21 It must be conceded that these mild attributes have on occasion been reinforced by
"arm-twisting" and "jaw boning" emanating from the White House.
"07See Gamser, The Role of Mediation in Airline Labor Disputes, 35 J. AIR L. & COM.
505 (1969).
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which the NMB, as an agency, presently cannot do under the RLA, their roles
as neutrals might yield greater success in assisting the parties in reaching agreement.
V. CONCLUSION

American labor law has come of age. It is now time to shed some cherished
myths. For instance, some may believe that the National Labor Relations
Board is an administrative agency in the conventional sense; in fact, it is mostly
a court, although not a very effective one. It is often assumed that discrimination cases concerning employment of minorities, where there is a union on the
premises, can be settled without reckoning with the collective bargaining and
arbitration process. In reality such cases are labor relations cases in the fullest
sense. Where there is an established collective bargaining contract the determination of unfair labor practices cannot be divorced from the dispute-settlement
machinery contained in that contract; in such cases, action under the NLRA
must be accommodated with action under section 301 and with arbitration.
Another myth concerns the efficacy of the administrative process. Administrative agencies have substantial limitations; the one we are most concerned
with here is rooted in the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers.
The Constitution decrees: "The judicial power of the United States, shall
be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress
may from time to time ordain and establish."'" This is the power which
is ultimately required for the enforcement of the federal labor laws. The
administrative process-much admired in recent history-is a useful adjunct
to the judicial process, but it lacks judicial power. When administrative
power is used as a substitute for judicial process, the inherent weakness in
agency action may impede rather than enhance the task of law enforcement.
Beyond any doubt, the experience with the National Labor Relations Board
establishes the existence of this weakness.
This Article is a plea for realistic examination of the procedural fragmentation which characterizes the administration of federal labor law. It is a plea to
use the administrative process wisely, to use it as a vital supplement to judicial
action, but not as a substitute for it. It is a plea for bold development of a new
court system which could tie together and enforce the nation's complex set of
labor laws which operate in the private sector."5
The writer believes this is the direction in which procedural reform, if it is
to be true reform, should inexorably move. The country needs a simpler system.
The unitary system here envisioned is designed for simplicity of operation. If
such a unitary system were to prove successful, legal promises would come
close to achieving social realities. Absolute success would indeed be utopian,
but any movement toward more effective administration would further the
noble objectives of the federal labor laws.
208

U.S. CONST. art. III,

§

1.

20' This paper has been confined to private sector labor relations, but the jurisdiction of

the proposed labor court could also be extended to federal labor laws applicable to public
employees.

